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Abstract
Following the 2014 European Parliament elections, the media focused on the strong showing of
populist, often Eurosceptic, parties across Europe. Despite most Eurosceptic parties employing
shared rhetoric and seemingly shared goals, Eurosceptic parties have failed to act cohesively
together in the European Parliament. Rather than form a large bloc in Parliament, Eurosceptic
parties have fractured into several political groups, which have among the lowest cohesion scores
on Roll Call Votes in Parliament. In this paper, I aim to get a more complete picture of the
pressures and incentives at play which keep Eurosceptic parties from cooperating. I specifically
ask what guides their political group formation and level of coordination within the European
Parliament, and what factors are responsible for the fragmented coordination of Eurosceptic
national parties that currently exists. I find that the degree of Euroscepticism of Eurosceptic
parties poses the clearest challenge to unity out of variables I examine, and is exacerbated by
poor structure and leadership in Eurosceptic political groups. The nature and dimensions of these
disagreements suggest that Eurosceptic unity in the near future is likely to continue to be elusive.
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Introduction
The early Twenty-First Century has seen Eurosceptic parties make several gains and
inroads into European governments. One of the victories that attracted substantial media
attention was the 2014 European Parliament election. Across Europe, national parties ran in the
member states of the European Union in order to get Members of the European Parliament
elected. Many news sources noted that Eurosceptic parties (parties opposed to EU integration)
had in multiple countries substantially increased their representation. Following the election, The
Economist ran an article labelled, “The Eurosceptic Union,” and a BBC News story proclaimed,
“Eurosceptic ‘earthquake’ rocks EU elections”. 1 The Telegraph declared the election “a stunning
defeat for the European political establishment”. 2
Some observers of EU politics had more measured reactions to the elections. Cas Mudde
argued that while Eurosceptic parties made gains, the increase in the number of Members of the
European Parliament (MEPs) was almost entirely due to the advances of the National Front
(though he also noted that Eurosceptic parties were more Eurosceptic than the past, possibly due
to the Eurozone crisis). 3 Many scholars who have done research on the Parliament also argue
that it is a “second-order” election, of minimal importance to the citizens of member states. This
might mean constituents vote in order to punish ruling parties or vote without strategic
considerations. Because of this, the Parliamentary election might not accurately measure
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“The Eurosceptic Union,” The Economist.
“Eurosceptic ‘earthquake’ rocks EU Elections,” BBC News.
2
Waterfield et al. “European elections 2014: EU citizens vote against immigrants, austerity and establishment.” The
Telegraph.
3
Mudde, On Extremism and Democracy in Europe, 32.
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Eurosceptic support. However, many took the strong showing of Eurosceptics as a sign that their
power was growing, and that they might continue to rise further.
While news and academics differed slightly in their calculations of the anti-system vote
depending on their definitions, many found that roughly a quarter of seats in the European
Parliament went to Eurosceptic parties. Performing especially well electorally were France’s
National Front, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), and Italy’s Five Star
Movement. Following the election, leaders of Eurosceptic parties frequently offered opinions
close to that of The Telegraph, suggesting that the election might be the beginning of a new
order. Some authors suggested that it might not be far in the future until Eurosceptics constituted
a legitimate political opposition within the Parliament.
Euroscepticism is frequently defined as opposition to further European integration and
deepening. While left-wing Eurosceptics exist, right-wing Eurosceptics have more representation
in the Parliament, and are the main focus of this paper (in this paper, Eurosceptic refers to rightwing Euroscepticism unless otherwise indicated). Eurosceptic parties, regardless of country of
origin, frequently speak of the importance of retaining national sovereignty and not ceding power
to bureaucrats in Brussels. Despite most Eurosceptic parties employing shared rhetoric and
seemingly shared goals, Eurosceptic parties have failed to act cohesively together in the
European Parliament. Since the 2014 election, which was widely considered a relative success
for Eurosceptic parties, they have failed to act cohesively on multiple fronts.
Generally, parties entering the European Parliament join political groups, transnational
groups made up of the national parties of member states that share an agenda. Eurosceptic parties
within the Parliament have not formed one political group, which would give them more
finances from the European Parliament budget and allow them greater speaking time and
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favorable committee positions. Instead, UKIP and the National Front competed to attract
Eurosceptic parties. The result was Eurosceptic parties joining three political groups, two small
enough to be constantly on the brink of dissolution. This is inefficient if you expect Eurosceptic
parties to have generally shared values and agendas.
Eurosceptics have also displayed lack of cohesion in their votes on EU legislation. Most
political groups have high voting cohesion: the national parties that make up the group adhere to
an agreed upon line and frequently vote the same way. This allows the political group to have
greater sway in the Parliament, and a system of compromise and consultation initiated by
political group leaders is meant to ensure national parties feel like the group is acting in their
interest. The Eurosceptic political groups, in contrast, have relatively low cohesion overall. In
Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD), it is often unclear what the ‘line’ of the
political group is, and the other two political groups with significant Eurosceptic makeup also
share low cohesion rates. Lastly, several Eurosceptic parties within the Parliament have had
several members desert their national party, or had public rifts that split the party violently (such
as Alternative for Germany (AfD)). This suggests that Eurosceptic parties may even have
difficult cooperating or remaining stable on an intra-party level.
In this context, the cause of this dysfunction is not immediately clear. The lack of
cooperation could be due to a lack of experience in the Parliament, an adjustment period that
might disappear over time. However, it may be more to do with deeper-rooted ideological
differences or rigid sets of priorities that do not accommodate for compromise with other
Eurosceptic parties. If it is the former, Eurosceptics organization and agreement in the
Parliament might be just a matter of time, assuming their support among voters remains steady.
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If the second explanation is more accurate, more time would not change cooperation
substantially.
In this paper, I aim to create a more complete picture of the pressures and incentives
which keep Eurosceptic parties from cooperating. As a whole, my thesis will explore the options
and strategies available to Eurosceptic national parties within the European Parliament (EP). I
specifically ask what guides their political group formation and level of coordination within the
European Parliament, and what factors are responsible for the fragmented coordination of
Eurosceptic national parties that currently exists. In the following chapters, I examine strategic
considerations of Eurosceptic parties, their ideological attributes, and their institutionalization
and structure within the Parliament among other explanations to help explain their relatively
disunity. To explore and test these theories, I look at negotiations over political group formation
and voting patterns and cohesion for Eurosceptic parties.
An in-depth examination of the disagreements and fault lines between Eurosceptic
national parties has several uses and impacts. First, an examination of the reasons for disunity
among Eurosceptic parties should offer insight into how likely the parties are to coordinate in the
future. If the instability of political groups is something that should decrease with time (such as
Eurosceptic parties just being new to Parliament, or not fully institutionalized) the relative lack
of cohesion may be a short-lived phenomenon, and Eurosceptic parties might be expected to
work together more consistently in the future. This may have secondary effects on their level of
actual power in the Parliament. However, results pointing to ideological differences among
Eurosceptic parties or irreconcilable priorities in government may point to a more long-term
problem for the rising Eurosceptic right, even if the number of Eurosceptic MEPs continues to
rise.

9

The conclusions of this paper also inform discussions of Eurosceptic and populist
coordination outside of the Parliament. There have been multiple attempts by far-right parties in
Europe to create a network of populist or Eurosceptic parties. In 1997, Le Pen attempted to
popularize a European National Union, a pan-European confederation of right-wing parties,
which had little real impact. The Austrian Freedom Party also has tried to facilitate far-right
coordination, and while there have been moments of success, like a meeting in 2005, there has
been little forward momentum. 4 While several of these attempts have been to gather far-right
parties rather than Eurosceptic ones, these characteristics do tend to correlate, with many farright parties espousing rhetoric that is hostile to the European Union or openly antagonistic
towards it. Testing the causes of disunity I identify in the Parliament to see if they apply to
Eurosceptic coordination outside of that body could explain Eurosceptic coordination (or lack
thereof) on a larger scale. It would also help corroborate the extent to which causes of disunity
are artificially created or fostered by the Parliament’s rules or environment, rather than being
endemic to Eurosceptic and far-right parties.
Organization of Thesis
The first chapter provides relevant background about the European Parliament and
Eurosceptic parties in the EU. It also defines terms and creates classification systems for these
parties.
Chapter 2 examines the pertinent background literature on the cooperation and political
group structure in the Parliament, as well as Eurosceptic strategy. This is meant to gather
information on how political groups usually act, and what the general incentives are for political
groups to form and cooperate. The review also covers the state of literature on Eurosceptic
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parties, which also helps us extract reasons they may be uncooperative for later examination.
Drawing on the major argument and conclusions of the literature, Chapter 2 also outlines the
hypotheses examined through the rest of the thesis that explore different drivers of Eurosceptic
disunity.
Chapter 3 mainly explores why Eurosceptic political groups form the way they do. While
the general incentives of resource maximization and ideological proximity undoubtedly influence
group formation, this chapter looks more at how strategic considerations shape who Eurosceptic
parties accept as coalition partners. Specifically, it argues that concerns over respectability
substantially shape the array of parties a Eurosceptic party will be willing to join a political
group with.
The fourth chapter begins to explore why Eurosceptic parties frequently vote against the
political group line, even in dominantly Eurosceptic groups. I briefly explore whether
Eurosceptic voting cooperation is worse than other niche party families in the Parliament. I then
explore three different ideological reasons for disagreement between Eurosceptic parties:
presence or absence of populism, placement on the left-right ideological spectrum, and degree of
Euroscepticism.
Chapter 5 continues to explore voting cohesion among Eurosceptic parties. Rather than
looking into ideological explanations, it looks at lack of institutionalization for both the political
group and Eurosceptic parties as causing disunity. Most political groups within the Parliament
have formalized structures that incentivize national parties to vote with them, and many national
parties have long tenures within their political groups. This chapter argues that the relative
newness and dysfunction of Eurosceptic political groups themselves play a major role in lack of
voting cohesion.
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The conclusion offers additional analysis on the results of the rest of the thesis, and
clarifies which hypotheses appear the most significant. It also explores what these results tell us
about the future of Eurosceptic coordination, in and out of the Parliament.
A Note on Data Usage
Much of the quantitative data used in this thesis comes from two main sources. Since
each data set has potential issues, I use them in conjunction with each other with the aim of
double-checking the validity of the results.
The first measure of cooperation I use is from VoteWatch Europe, a site which includes
aggregations of roll call votes (RCVs) for the most recent Parliament. VoteWatch Europe
provides measures of national parties’ voting loyalty to political group. I use their collection of
roll call votes from the beginning of the eighth Parliamentary term until November 2017. In their
methodology, VoteWatch clarifies, “We have defined the political line of either a European
political group or a national party delegation as the position adopted by the plurality of MEPs
within that Group or Delegation…. An MEP is considered ‘loyal’ to his/her European political
group or national party delegation if his/her voting option is identical to the political line of the
political group or party delegation, respectively”. 5
Essentially, if a plurality of the voting national party MEPs votes the same way as the
plurality of the political group, the national party is considered loyal on that vote. While this
seems like it would generally be an accurate mechanism to measure loyalty to political group, it
does not come without issues. First, large national parties that dominate political groups will very
likely always be coded as agreeing with their political group, since they make up a plurality of
members. The only requirement then to be seen as loyal to the political group then is to vote

5
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together as a party. The National Front, for example, is calculated as having over a 99% loyalty
rating, since it has so many MEPs in the political group. Additionally, when loyalty to political
group for smaller parties is calculated, VoteWatch may be mainly just considering how these
smaller parties vote with the large, dominant national party in the political group, not necessarily
whether it agrees with smaller parties in the coalition. While many political groups do not have
as clear a ‘central party’ as the National Front in the ENF, the definition of cohesion does present
problems in these cases.
My other set of data is meant to correct for this issue. The second resource is a record of
2,535 roll call votes, from the beginning of the Eighth Parliament to March 1 2017. 6 While the
set was initially fragmented to record the votes of individual MEPs, I aggregated it to instead
track votes on a national party level. Rather than see how the national parties voted in
comparison to political group, I instead tracked their rate of agreement with each individual
national party in the political group with them. If a majority of the members of a national party
voted the same way as a majority of the members of another national party, the two parties were
seen as being in agreement on that vote. The total agreement of two parties would be percent of
total votes that they voted in the same direction. The mean national party agreement for a
political group would measure the mean of the total agreement of two parties for every
combination of two parties that could exist within that political group.
While this helps ameliorate problems that the size of parties present to measuring
cooperation (which exist in the first database) there are some issues. Because I wanted to record
the amount of time that parties are actively voting together, I included MEPs absent in voting in
the analysis. So if a majority of MEPs in one party voted one way, and all the MEPs for another
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party were absent from the vote, the parties were recorded as being in disagreement on this vote.
This leads to much lower rates of cooperation than the VoteWatch database. While the parties
may not actually be in disagreement (it is impossible to know how the absentee party would have
voted if they had attended), I coded the dataset this way because I only wanted parties to be
considered in cooperation if they could actually convince a majority of their members to vote the
same way as each other. This does mean that some parties are given extremely low rates of
cooperation with all other parties since they so rarely voted.
While both datasets have issues that could potentially lead to misleading results, the flaws
between them are not the same. This means that when they both produce relatively similar results
the results are likely significant, and when they differ I should be able to delve deeper and
determine the reason for that difference.
Since the data to measure cooperation in this thesis is frequently based on roll call votes,
it is worth making a note on the strengths and drawbacks of roll call vote data. In the past, critics
have argued that roll call votes tend to hide certain aspects of EP voting behavior, and therefore
are not a fair representation of MEP votes and interests. Committee votes are not considered in
databases of roll call votes. Under certain conditions Parliamentary matters may be decided
based on a vote of hands or electronic voting, where the total number is recorded but the
identities of voters are not, or there may be a secret ballot. 7 A roll call vote is only required for a
final vote on a legislative act, and when either forty MEPs or a political group request it.
However, changes in recent EU treaties including Lisbon have helped make RCVs a
more reliable source of data, which is perhaps why they are so frequently utilized. Legislative
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items are now frequently given RCV status. While perhaps not a perfect representation of MEP
or party interests, many scholars argue that they can certainly approximate them. 8

8

Ibid., 87.
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Chapter 1
This chapter includes much of the background information necessary to understand this
thesis. First I provide a profile of the European Parliament, including its general powers, makeup, elections and operations. I then give a working definition of Euroscepticism and the
Eurosceptic party, differentiating the concepts from related ideas such as populism. I introduce
the classification system to define parties currently in the Parliament as Eurosceptic, and profile
the major Eurosceptic parties and political groups. Lastly I restate the central question of this
thesis which will hopefully be clearer to readers in the context of the background information.
The European Parliament: General Powers
The European Parliament was initially assembled in 1958 as a body of the European
Union that had little formal power. The European Commission, a body with staff appointed by
national governments, could propose legislation. Legislation could be approved by the Council
of the European Union, which was made up of ministers of national governments. The
Parliament was only consulted on some legislative proposals and was given the power to dismiss
the Commission with a two-thirds majority. 9
Largely due to the efforts of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) the powers of
the Parliament have grown over time. Budget treaties in the 1970s gave the Parliament joint
budgetary authority with the Council, letting Parliament have a say in tweaking or amending the
budget and requiring a final vote on the budget’s adoption. The Single European Act in 1987
dramatically increased the Parliament’s power by requiring Parliamentary assent for certain
agreements. For accession treaties and associations agreements to pass, the approval of both the

9
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Council and the Parliament was required. Subsequent treaties, notably Maastricht and Lisbon,
continued to incrementally increase the Parliament’s power. 10
Today, “co-decision” between the Council and Parliament is the law for almost all areas
of EU competence. Most legislative proposals are still drafted by the Commission. However, a
majority of MEPs and qualified majority of ministers in the Council must normally approve of
legislation for it to be enacted. Generally the Parliament and Council work concurrently on their
versions of legislation, and the Parliament will send the Council its finished version to approve.
If the Council votes against the Parliament legislation it will return the legislation to Parliament
giving the reasons for its rejection. The Parliament also votes to approve the nominated
Commissioners every five years after European elections, and elects the President of the
Commission as well.
While the involvement in almost all legislative affairs may make it sound like the
European Parliament is one of the strongest EU institutions, many still characterize it as weak
and secondary. Many of the affairs of the EU, especially regarding external relationships, are
dealt with more by the Commission or Council. Members of a committee in the Parliament were
only recently given access to confidential documents related to European Common Defense and
Security Policy, and after an internal conflict. 11 While the Parliament must consent to accession
treaties (for new countries to enter the EU) and trade agreements, they get minimal role in the
process of carrying out negotiations or discussion in the formation of these agreements. While
the Parliament theoretically can leverage its power to vote down these agreements, this rarely
occurs and would likely be taken badly by the other EU institutions.

10
11

Ibid., 2.
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The schedule and organization of the European Parliament is meant to allow for a
coherent and thorough consideration of legislation. Legislative proposals are referred to the
relevant committee for consideration and drafting. Committees are set up at the beginning of
each EP session with two and a half year terms, and the number of both committees and
members on committees generally change at the start of and half-way through each session.
Following the 2014 elections, there were twenty committees in the EP, all with twenty-five or
more members. Many MEPs are full members of one committee and a substitute member on
another (a substitute is allowed to attend and speak at meetings, but only vote under specific
circumstances). There is no “seniority rule” for committees. 12
Plenaries are the meetings of all of the Parliament to raise and debate recent issues and
consider the passage of reports and legislation. When legislation that received an overwhelming
majority in committee is introduced it is often passed without debate and with one single vote,
unless there are clear signs of dissent. Controversial legislation features lengthier debates with
speaking time given to the Commission, Council, author of the legislation, and MEPs. Proposals
to add amendments to reports must be backed by a political group, a relevant committee, or more
than forty MEPs.
Roll call votes, where individual member’s votes are recorded, are required for final
votes. Following a final vote, individual members or groups are allotted time to explain the
reasons behind their voting choice. After each day of plenary the daily minutes, a record of texts
adopted, and a verbatim report is released. 13
Within this complex system, individual MEPs always are assured some basic options.
Among other rights, individual MEPs may “put questions to the Commission or Council, table a
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motion for resolution or a written declaration, table and move amendments to any text in
committee… make explanations of vote, ask questions related to the work of Parliament’s
leadership… raise points of order or move the inadmissibility of a matter”. 14
European Union Elections
The European Parliament became an elected body in 1979, and it remains the only
directly elected institution of the European Union. Elections to the Parliament occur every five
years; the most recent elections were in 1979. Elections occur in each individual member state of
the EU simultaneously. The EU allows member states to have some control over the election
process: some states use open rather than closed lists, and there are different minimum thresholds
of vote shares necessary for a party to enter the Parliament depending on the member state.
However, since the United Kingdom stopped using a first past the post system for European
Parliament elections, all member states have used a proportional representative system where
citizens will frequently vote for the national party they want to represent them in the European
Parliament. 15 The allocation of seats is not, strictly speaking, directly proportional, rather a
slightly greater share of seats in the Parliament are given to smaller states. This “degressive
proportionality” is meant to give smaller states in the Parliament substantive representation.
Under the last electoral rules, 751 MEPs were elected for the 2014 session.
Elections for the European Parliament are generally considered “second-order elections”,
a term coined by Karlheinz Reif and Hermann Schmitt. According to this, voters view EP
elections as less important than national elections just for their country. This first would explain
the low turnout across Europe for EP elections. But scholars like Hix and Marsh also believe that
since they view these elections as unimportant, voters will frequently vote against the parties in
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power in their national legislature to “punish” them. 16 Under this view, ruling parties will usually
have lost support since their last election, and there may be widespread discontent among most
of the voter base, either with the ruling party or the “mainstream” political establishment.
Because of this, voters will use EP elections to manifest their displeasure, turning to opposition
or fringe parties. Other scholars contend that EP elections are truly about European issues, and
voters are more likely to turn to parties whose goals meet their vision of what Europe should
actually look like. Rather than voting strategically for one or two major parties, voters can turn to
parties that most closely align with their ideal preferences. 17 If this is the case, Eurosceptics do
well in the Parliament because their platforms on Europe resemble what a decent segment of the
population really desires.
Political Groups in the European Parliament
Political groups are coalitions of national parties in parliament that coordinate and
frequently work together in order to achieve shared goals. Evans and Vink define political
groups in parliament as post-electoral coalitions between national party delegations and
individuals who broadly identify with a set of programmatic principles. 18 After elections to the
European Parliament, national parties coordinate and negotiate over joining political groups.
While individual MEPs leaving their national party’s political group to join another political
group is rare, this occasionally occurs. To keep political groups from essentially being large
national parties, EP rules mandate that a political group must have twenty-five or more MEPs
from at least seven member states. Furthermore, a political group must have a shared political
agenda or shared political values. This is following a precedent set in 1999 where the European

16
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Court of Justice broke up a political group that included France’s National Front on the grounds
that the national parties making it up had no shared political value. Individual MEPs or national
parties may choose not to join a political group at all, in which case they are Non-Inscrits (NI).
Political groups in the European Parliament can help facilitate smooth functioning, and
act as networks that help guide and inform the actions and votes of individual MEPs. In this
sense, it is fair to think of political groups in the EP as a supranational version of the national
parties that make up the parliaments of many democracies. Political groups agree on policy
positions through negotiations and discussion among their members and national parties. This is
made easier by an EP schedule that sets aside a “group week” after committees meet for political
groups to plan and whip votes. During this week political groups may negotiate between national
parties with different perspectives on upcoming legislation, plan amendments to try to attach to
legislation introduced in plenary and contact other political groups to arrange coalitions or
compromises, among other activities. 19 Group chairs (or co-chairs) elected by the MEPs of the
political group lead most of these external negotiations. By allowing political groups to plan and
reach inter-party understandings at earlier stages, there is potentially less conflict and confusion
at the plenary stage. 20
Ideally, a political group will have a shared political ideology or framework, so
disagreement among members will be minimal. In many cases MEPs will rely on political group
recommendations or advice on voting issues, especially when they are unfamiliar with the policy
area or do not have time or inclination to delve into the specifics of the issue. However,
disagreements on voting issues are frequent, especially among certain political groups. National
parties within the political groups are an important point of cleavage, and are a substantial threat
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to political group unity; if the leader of a national party tells their MEPs to vote against the
political group the political group would be divided.
To try to bring dissident or reluctant MEPs into line, political groups have several tools at
their disposal. Political groups assign members to committees, and dissident delegates may be
punished halfway through a term by being removed from a favorable position. 21 A political
group also has some control over the allocation of speaking time in debate between its members,
so in certain circumstances in plenary it could keep dissident members from speaking.
The actual ability of political group leaders to curb or deter dissidents is contested, and
many believe the options they have to effectively “whip” votes are minimal. If a major national
party within the political group goes against the political group line the rest of the political group
realistically may not have many options- the national party could be embedded in leadership and
deter retribution, or could threaten to leave the political group, weakening or dissolving the
group. Even if the political group does vote to expel an MEP, which happens rarely, MEPs that
switch parties do not automatically lose positions like committee chair. If several parties defect
from the original political group line, it is difficult to call the original recommendation a
common or agreed-upon line to begin with.
Moreover, national parties have their own techniques to “whip” votes and keep their
MEPs for voting against national party interest. Faas points out that MEPs may be willing to
buck their political group and vote for their national party if they believe that the national party
has means to control their re-election or political future. 22 Because of this, several scholars have
found that national parties that closely monitor their MEPs and deploy credible threats to not renominate MEPs in the future will more frequently vote against the political group on contested
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issues. Additionally, while political groups may “decide” committee assignments this is done
based off of the nominations of national parties. So while a national party may happily censure a
troublemaker within their party, they are unlikely to discipline an individual member of the
national party when that individual went along with the national party line.
Inclusion in a political group may sometimes mean that a national party is pressured to
deviate from what it sees as its core principles, in the name of cohesion or unity with the larger
group. But there are numerous advantages involved with political group inclusion. First, political
groups are directly funded by the Parliament for their operations. Each political group is given a
small set share of the budget, and then a larger share proportioned to their number of MEPs.
When the Europe of Nations and Freedoms (ENF) group had 48 seats in 2015, they received 1.5
million Euros for the first six months of their operations (this would be around 62,500 Euros per
member per year). By contrast, non-attached members without a political group are generally
given 48,000 Euros per member annually. 23 The Parliament also provides office space and
meeting rooms for political groups, and professional staff in proportion to the size of the political
group as well.
Secondly, political groups are accorded more speaking time and visibility in the public
sphere. During a plenary debate, every political group is given a base number of minutes of
speaking time, and a greater number of minutes proportional to their number of minutes. Political
groups may divide this between some members, or let a political group leader use all of it. NonInscrits are given next to no speaking time in these debates. Leaders of political groups can
expect a certain amount of courtesy when they send delegations to national parties.

23
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Thirdly, political groups are given more rights and representation in EP negotiation and
policy. A political group can call a roll call vote in plenary, which is used to put their group vote
on record, make sure members vote as ordered, or embarrass another group. The reconciliation
process between the Council and Parliament has representatives of the political groups, as does
the Conference of Presidents. A request by a political group to table (or withdraw) an
amendment is easier than trying to find forty members throughout the Parliament to agree to this.
Lastly, inclusion in a political group is generally necessary to get premier committee assignment,
including chairmanships and vice-chairmanships.
Some of the aforementioned benefits are clearly only benefits to a national party if the
political group they join generally shares their agenda. It is not advantageous for a national party
to be in a political group with more speaking time if the political group uses that time to advance
goals that the national party disagrees with. Other political group benefits are advantageous even
if the agenda of the political group is divergent, such as access to a greater amount of
Parliamentary funding. This mix has led to some debate about whether national parties generally
join political groups because of the structural incentives related to that group, vs the ideological
proximity of the political group’s agenda to the national party’s. However, if a political group
accurately articulates the goals or agenda of a national party, and their agendas are not in tension,
joining a political group can help air the national party’s views for a longer time and to a larger
audience, as well as provide greater sway in getting their ideal policies passed.
There are currently eight political groups in the European Parliament, not including the
small number of Non-Inscrits. The largest political group is the European People’s Party (EPP), a
center-right party with 214 MEPs, the second largest is the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and
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Democrats (S&D), which is made up of center-left parties. The largest political group in
Parliament has historically switched between two groups along these ideological lines.
Table 1: Political Groups in the Eighth Parliament (as of early 2018)
Political Group name
Number of MEPs in group
European People’s Party (EPP)
217
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and
189
Democrats (S&D)
European Conservatives and Reformists
74
(ECR)
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for
68
Europe (ALDE)
European United Left–Nordic Green Left
52
(GUE-NGL)
The Greens–European Free Alliance (Greens– 51
EFA)
Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy
45
(EFDD)
Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF)
37
Non-Inscrits (NI)
18
Euroscepticism and Populism
Populism and Euroscepticism are frequently mentioned simultaneously and sometimes
interchangeably, and as such it is necessary to define and differentiate them. Mudde defines
populism as, “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two
homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which
argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the
people”. 24 In his 2016 work Jan-Werner Müller supports the basic tenets of this definition.
Müller sees being anti-elitist as a necessary condition for an entity to qualify as populist, but
points out that many parties of all stripes sometimes use anti-elitist or antisystem rhetoric. The
other necessary component for a party to meet to qualify as populist is an antipluralist rhetoric or
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ideology that portrays competitors and other parties as illegitimate enemies of the people rather
than other kindred organizations also working for a viable political system. 25
It should be noted that as used here the term populism is issue-neutral, that is to say it
does not necessitate one set view on a given social or governmental issue. While commentators
who speak of rising populism in Europe generally refer to parties that are based around a fairly
conservative ideology, populism may refer to a far-left party or candidate as well.
Euroscepticism is not a value-neutral term. Rather it describes a specific set of beliefs regarding
the European Union. While some of the literature surrounding the populist movement will be
used in the paper given the degree of overlap between populist and Eurosceptic parties, the terms
will not be used interchangeably.
There is greater variability in the definition of Euroscepticism. Hobolt defines
Euroscepticism as a sentiment of disapproval towards European integration. 26 Mudde, in
contrast, states that Eurosceptics believe in the basic tenets of European integration, but are
skeptical about the current direction of the European Union. 27 Szczerbiak and Taggart divide
Euroscepticism into two more specific categories; they define hard Euroscepticism as “outright
rejection of the entire project of European political and economic integration, and opposition to
one’s country joining or remaining a member of the EU” and soft Euroscepticism as “contingent
or qualified opposition to integration”. 28
For this paper, I define a Eurosceptic party as one which makes advocacy against further
European integration or against the EU a central and constant component of their message or
agenda. While this is a more narrow definition of Euroscepticism than that used by most
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scholars, it is meant to eliminate from consideration parties that employ Eurosceptic rhetoric on
very specific occasions, and those whose manifestoes or rhetoric indicate a degree of
Euroscepticism but do not highlight positions on EU integration as important to the party. While
it may be unclear on whether some European parties meet this definition, this paper will largely
focus on national parties that clearly fall within the definition.
Additionally, references to Eurosceptic unity or cohesion will refer to voting or group
cohesion among Eurosceptic parties with a conservative or right-wing ideology. The European
Parliament also has parties that are classified as “left-wing Eurosceptic,” many are found in the
GUE-NGL political group. These groups are not principally opposed to the European Union or
closer integration, rather they often oppose the EU because they are strongly against its use of
austerity and other programs they see as oppressive. These groups are not included in the
following analysis because it seems clear that a far different position on the left-right political
spectrum would generally keep them from permanent coalition or coordination with far-right
groups, even if they do somewhat share their distrust of the EU.
Classification of Current Parliament
While there are three political groups which sometimes use Eurosceptic rhetoric, only
two of these mark Euroscepticism as a clear priority. The European Conservatives and
Reformists (ECR) group is the third largest group in the Parliament. Its website describes the
group as “Eurorealist” and in favor of decentralizing EU powers. The main page also makes
clear that the group is not in favor of EU break-up, but that the EU “should do less but do it
better”. 29 ECR was set up in 2009 by the British Conservatives, who wanted to leave the EPP. In
the current legislative session the ECR has seventy-four MEPs, with the two largest national
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parties being the British Conservatives and the Law and Justice (PiS) party of Poland. Its
chairman is Syed Kamall of the British Conservatives. While the ECR contains multiple
Eurosceptic parties, many of its parties are believed to only criticize the EU because it is
strategically advantageous. Because of this, the ECR is considered the least Eurosceptic political
group.
The seventh largest political group in the Parliament is the Europe of Freedom and Direct
Democracy (EFDD). EFDD was organized predominantly by UKIP after the 2014 elections. The
other party with a large number of MEPs is Italy’s Five Star Movement, though it has considered
leaving the group during the most recent term. EFDD currently has forty-one MEPs, and is cochaired by Nigel Farage of UKIP and (until recently) David Borrelli of the Five Star Movement.
Both major parties (and many smaller coalition partners) have frequently used Eurosceptic
rhetoric and emphasized the importance of EU integration as an issue.
The smallest political group in the EP is the Europe of Nations and Freedoms group. This
group was not officially established until 2015, since the National Front was not able to
immediately find enough coalition partners to satisfy the EP criteria for a valid political group.
Eventually the National Front was able to find enough interested MEPs to put together the group,
notably from the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and
Italy’s Northern League. Language on the ENF website is extremely Eurosceptic, and also
frequently references sovereign nations being under attack and the need for European countries
to protect their borders. The ENF currently has forty MEPs and is co-chaired by Marcel de Graaf
(PVV) and Nicholas Bay (FN), and National Front MEPs make up a majority of the group.
To designate the Eurosceptic parties in the Parliament I used the 2014 Chapel Hill expert
survey (CHES). The survey is given to political scientists who assign values to parties running in
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the 2014 EP elections on multiple issues, including their position on EU integration and their
position on the left-right spectrum. Among these measures are “EU position”, ranking a party’s
feelings on integration on a 1 to 7 scale (1=very against, 7=very for) and “EU salience”, ranking
the importance of integration as an issue to the party on a 1 to 10 scale (1=very unimportant,
10=very important). 30
As this study seeks to examine Eurosceptic cooperation, I tried to avoid classifying
parties as Eurosceptic that might indicate some disapproval of the EU or EU integration but do
not make it a large part of their platform or goals. Because of this, I filtered the CHES dataset to
only consider national parties that scored a 3 or lower on European Integration and a 5 or greater
on EU salience. The top ten parties, in number of seats won in the 2014 election are shown
below, as they include the most powerful Eurosceptic parties in Parliament. A complete table of
all parties meeting the above qualifications is included in Table 1 of the appendix.
Table 2: Largest (right-wing) Eurosceptic parties in the Eighth Parliament
Country

Party

Seats won by party
(2014)

Seats retained by party
(2017)

EU
Position

EU
Salience

UK

UKIP

24

22

1.14

9.14

France

FN

23

20

1.21

8.46

Italy

M5S

17

17

1.43

8.86

Hungary

Fidesz 12

11

2.71

6.36

Germany

AfD

7

2

1.61

9.54

Italy

LN

5

5

1.14

8.86

Denmark

DPP

4

3

1.91

7.27

Netherlands PVV

4

4

1.09

8.36

Austria

4

4

1.9

6.7

30

FPO

Polk et al. “Chapel Hill Electoral Survey.”
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Poland

KNP

4

1.06

3

8

Opposition to the EU by these parties can be corroborated in statements to the press by
party members and leaders, analysis of academics and party web sites, and manifestos. The 2014
Euromanifesto Study, for example, does content analysis of party programs for the 2014 EP
elections. It notes positive and negative mentions of EU integration, with a negative score
signaling hostile mentions of Europe, and a rejection of a more integrated Europe. Nine of the
top ten parties mentioned above have negative scores on this measure (the exception being the
Five Star Movement) as did many of their coalition partners in the ENF and EFDD. 31 A 2015 list
by Hobolt also includes all of the major parties listed above in its table of Eurosceptic parties. 32
To illustrate the landscape in terms of characteristics of Eurosceptic parties, I also include
a table below with the attributes of the top ten Eurosceptic parties. The placement on a left-right
spectrum is gathered from the CHES dataset, while the classification as populist or hard/soft
Eurosceptic is determined by academic classifications corroborated by party documents.
Table 3: Characteristics of the Top Ten Eurosceptic parties in the Parliament
Country

Party

Original Political
Group

Populist Degree of
Euroscepticism

Left-right spectrum
(0-10)

UK

UKIP

EFDD

No

Hard

9.14

France

FN

ENF

Yes

Hard

9.64

Italy

M5S

EFDD

Yes

Soft

4.67

Hungary

Fidesz EPP

Yes

Soft

7.93

Germany

AfD

ECR

Yes

Hard

8.92

Italy

LN

ENF

Yes

Hard

8.86

Denmark

DF

ECR

Yes

Hard

6.90

31
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30

Netherlands PVV

ENF

Yes

Hard

9.25

Austria

FPO

ENF

Yes

Hard

8.70

Poland

KNP

NI

Yes

Hard

9.53

Scope of Thesis
Rather than forming one political group in the Parliament, Eurosceptic parties are
gathered in three smaller political groups, and a large number of Eurosceptic MEPs are not in
any political group at all. This is problematic since smaller political groups are more vulnerable
to dissolution; they may struggle to meet the required number of members and nationalities.
A second dimension of disunity between Eurosceptic groups is their cohesion as a
political group. In a 2003 analysis, Faas found that MEPs from Eurosceptic national parties are
more likely to defect from political group lines. 33 Since the 2014 elections, the Eurosceptic
political groups remain the lowest cohesion on roll-call votes in many policy areas. In other
words, even among the Eurosceptic parties that form coalitions meant to support their
overlapping goals and ideologies, Eurosceptic parties frequently vote differently on
Parliamentary matters.
Thirdly, Eurosceptic parties have had internal divisions during the 2014 Parliamentary
term. Several Eurosceptic parties have had their MEPs split into two parties, or seen their MEPs
renounce the party they were elected into the Parliament on, and move to different parties or
political groups. Both the Alternative for Deutschland (Germany) and the Congress for the New
Right (Poland) have seen their representation drop because of internal clashes. UKIP has seen
several MEPs void themselves of allegiance to the party and declare themselves Independent or
Conservative.
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In the following chapters, I examine the causes and explanations for this disunity among
Eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament. Given that the values and goals espoused by
many Eurosceptic parties are similar in nature I ask what factors prevent greater coordination and
cooperation between them. While there are multiple causes of Eurosceptic disunity, this work
seeks to not only identify these causes but to contextualize them and weigh their salience and
importance in the European Parliament today.
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Chapter 2
In this chapter, I cover and evaluate the literature on group formation and voting in the
European Parliament. To understand whether Eurosceptic cooperation is ‘deviant’ in the
European Parliament, and the modes of cooperation that are typically expected from political
groups, it is important to look at current theories on how cooperation in the Parliament functions.
This literature covers conclusions and observations on national party cooperation within the
Parliament and how Eurosceptic parties conceive of their role. But besides helping uncover
possible motivations for Eurosceptic disunity, this review can also reveal current gaps. I pay
particular attention to what the literature points to as reasons that groups with similar agendas
may disagree.
I also integrate the hypotheses tested in the rest of this thesis into the literature review.
The hypotheses are generally based around possible reasons for (or dimensions of) Eurosceptic
disunity and are extracted from the current literature.
Literature
Scholars focusing on the European Parliament have written extensively on what shapes
the formation of political groups as well as pressures that influence voting behavior. Some of the
relevant literature also focuses on the barriers and obstacles preventing unity among populist
parties in general, and a relatively small field focuses on populist unity within the European
Parliament specifically.
Political Group Formation
Why don’t Eurosceptic parties join with each other in a single group, where they would
have more power? This section reviews literature of arguments about why parties join groups
generally, and then looks specifically at arguments about Eurosceptic incentives.
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Many debates on what guides national party choice revolve around the extent to which
parties choose based on ideological proximity, as opposed to structural incentives (such as
greater funds or better committee positions). Among those who argue ideological proximity,
there is a general consensus that while agreement on every issue is not essential, general attitudes
are. A 2011 work by Benoit and McElroy advances their theory of “political congruence” as the
determinant of political group placement. When parties were placed on a simpler twodimensional spectrum (left-right and pro-anti EU) many national parties’ placement was similar
to the central values of the political group itself. While they found that some factors seem to
matter less to placement, such as their placement on environmental issues, the authors conclude
“groups in the European Parliament tend to consist of parties with similar, but by no means
identical, policy positions on the dimensions that matter to them most”. 34 Edoardo Bressanelli,
agrees that ideology is the central motivating factor. When looking at party manifestos in 2009,
he found that the ideological positions of national parties matched most closely with their
political group roughly two-thirds of the time. From this he concludes that the political group
formation process is unlikely to either “change” national parties ideals, or force them to join with
other parties with vastly different ideals. 35
In another work, Benoit and McElroy use the British Conservatives as an example of how
ideology is centrally important to political group coexistence. Despite receiving political group
resources, the Conservatives constantly threatened to leave the group, clashing with leadership,
and eventually did create a new political group. The authors use several expert surveys to place
national parties on spectrums in four substantive areas. They then build a conditional logit model
on the basis that it is prohibitively difficult for parties to put together new political groups, and
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try to predict which political groups individual parties should be in if ideology is central. While
the model incorrectly placed some British parties relative to where they are in reality, a
substantial portion of party placement was correct. 36
Another point of view suggests structural issues are generally the cause. Rose and Borz
see large European parties as “catchall groups” that are happy to broaden or change their central
positions in order to maximize their positions in Parliament. The study uses the EU Profiler (a
database of National Party Programs) to compare national party ideals to the ideals of the
political group they end up joining. Rose and Borz argue that a noticeable gap in some cases
between national parties expressed ideology and the core of the political group shows that
structural incentives must play the larger role in shaping coalitions. 37 Their analysis,
however, does not offer a compelling reason for why political group cohesion is so high for so
many parties, if national parties are attracted by structural incentives.
Evans and Vink also suggest that resource-based considerations affect national parties’
choice of political group. They define political groups as “post-electoral coalitions between
national party delegations and individuals who broadly identify with a set of programmatic
principles”. 38 However, they also note that there are low transition costs for jumping from one
political group to another, and no sign that voters will register or be disturbed by a political
group switch, or even initially joining a political group poorly aligned with the national party
ideology. Because of this, non-extreme parties have incentives to join the larger centrist political
groups, because of the resources and greater institutional support they provide. Evans and Vink
point to Conservatives and even populists joining the Christian Democrats in the past because of
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these incentives, as well as Socialists receiving support from parties with other leftist
ideologies. 39 According to those who advocate for strategic incentives as a meaningful decider of
political group choice, national parties may join a political group with different core values just
to avoid being Non-Inscrits; they will also join a group with less ideological proximity because it
gives more resources and support than their old one.
Other authors take a middle ground in the discussion of whether national parties use
policy congruence or resources to determine political group. Maurer et al. point out that if
maximizing Parliamentary resources was all national parties cared about there would just be one
or two massive political groups, and argue that a likely more logical process is that national
parties seek the largest political group that broadly shares their policy preferences. Additionally,
however, they reject the assumption they feel is implicit in most analyses: that national parties
and political groups make these decisions based only on their interest in office, votes and
policy. 40 Rather they think individual member and party leader interests, such as career and
reelection, may shape political group switching. The British Conservative party in the EPP is
presented as an example of this pressure affecting events. After promising in a campaign to take
the Tories out of the EPP, and dealing with a vocal and Eurosceptic Conservative right, Cameron
seriously considered taking the Tories out of the EPP, balking at the time mostly because of the
lack of other suitable options and coalition partners. Cameron was prompted to consider
switching due to internal fissures, (which neither side above discusses) and prevented from it
largely because of strategic and electoral considerations.
Authors who examine Eurosceptic political groups specifically engage in both sides of
this debate. Startin argues that there are three main categories of reasons why Eurosceptics
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would want to join together in a political group. These are shared ideological conviction (such as
pro-sovereignty beliefs), respectability concerns (gaining legitimacy in the Parliament) and
practical survival considerations (speaking time and finances). 41 However, using interviews and
archival evidence surrounding the ITS, a past far-right political group in the Parliament, he notes
that in many situations these shared incentives may begin to fall apart, and are not necessarily
sufficient for continual cooperation. Shared ideological conviction may be difficult to actually
achieve because the far right is a ‘broad church’ with diversity of beliefs and an eagerness to
preference their own country. In the ITS, some members did not present themselves as
Eurosceptic and wanted an “EU identity”, and different factions of MEPs complained of having
different “political cultures”. 42
Under the second umbrella incentive, respectability, Startin hypothesizes that
membership in a political group may provide a much-needed example of legitimacy or
respectability, especially for parties often considered fringe or extremist. 43 By joining a group,
Eurosceptic parties may demonstrate that they are capable of international cooperation and full
participation in the institution. However, many other authors believe that concerns over
respectability often actually hinder coalitions between Eurosceptic parties. Whitaker notes that
after political groups were formed in 2014, voices in the United Kingdom’s media registered
dismay with the new parties that the British Conservatives were consorting with. 44 In On
Extremism and Democracy in Europe Mudde briefly mentions that the strategic divide between
nationally accepted and ostracized parties and the ideological divide between extreme and less
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extreme parties have caused problems for the far right in the European Parliament. 45 Corbett et
al. support this hypothesis, pointing out that the ENF, even as it struggled to find political group
partners, considered Greece’s Golden Dawn and Hungary’s Jobbik unacceptable due to their lack
of respectability. 46
Some authors suggest that other, non-Eurosceptic parties have managed to actually divide
Eurosceptic parties. Grabbe and Groot attribute at least some of the lack of Eurosceptic power to
the machinations of other political groups, pointing out that political groups conspired to block
EFDD nominees to Chairmanships. 47 Mudde seems to at least implicitly agree that some of the
Eurosceptic difficulties in assembling political groups are due to other more mainstream national
parties: he argues that the ECR deliberately courted groups that might normally coalesce with
UKIP in an attempt to rob them of a political group. 48 Corbett also notes that after Nigel Farage
of UKIP said he would use committee positions to sabotage the Parliament, an EFDD candidate
for the Petitions Committee chair was challenged and defeated, a similar process occurred with
AfD MEPs. 49 Mainstream disruption of the benefits of political group membership may diminish
the incentive to join.
Unfortunately, the argument that Eurosceptic unity is purposefully foiled by other
political actors is difficult to test, and there is no serious engagement of this theory in the rest of
this thesis. However, upon reviewing the literature, it seems that respectability is a key variable
for Eurosceptic political group formation. Given this, I present my first hypothesis, focused on in
Chapter 3, below.
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Hypothesis 1: If a Eurosceptic party is seen as disreputable or politically toxic, then other
Eurosceptic parties will be less willing to work with them in a political group.
Strategic considerations of Eurosceptic parties may drive their decisions on who to enter
political groups with. Strategic considerations include a party worrying about its reputation or the
impression it makes on national constituencies by joining forces with a disreputable party. It
should be noted that in itself strategic considerations should not affect the extent to which
different national parties vote together (though if the purposeful lack of coordination is due to an
ideological difference that might be expected). However, strategic considerations may affect who
national parties are willing to accept as coalition partners in political groups.
There are few sources of quantitative data regarding political group formation, both
because it cannot be recorded in the same way that roll call votes can and because negotiations
regarding inclusion in a political group happen far less frequently. Because of this, I examine
specific case studies of coalition negotiations to see if it is a driver of disunity. Included as
relevant examples of strategic decision-making guiding formation include a study of the ENF’s
quest to put together a political group and the mutual antagonism between UKIP and the
National Front which prevented a substantial alliance. As a sub-hypothesis in this area, I also
look at several Eurosceptic parties, including Fidesz, who seem to use political group formation
as an avenue to actively increase their resources or respectability.
Voting Behavior
What explains the cohesion ratings of Eurosceptic parties within their political groups?
Similar to above, I start with a review of the factors in political groups largely that scholars
believe elevate or lower cohesion to the political group line. This section then looks at past
authors attempts to describe how Euroscepticism affects voting cohesion rates.
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To understand when national parties or individual MEPs defect from their political
groups, it is beneficial first to understand why they so frequently vote as a unit. Roger and
Winzen point out that political groups are given substantial time during Parliament meetings to
negotiate and reconcile positions, and agree on voting positions. They also note Ringe’s
argument that MEPs outside of a committee will often not invest time into issues themselves, and
just follow the recommendation of party-members on the committee, lowering the odds of
individual rogue votes. 50 Hix et al. credit the internal “whipping” mechanisms of political groups
with at least some influence in MEP and national party votes, noting “they control the allocation
of committee positions, finances, speaking time, and the space on the legislative agenda. The
leadership of each European political group also controls the allocation of committee positions
and resources between the national party delegations within the European party group”. 51
Another author argues that cohesion is not so much about resources as much as whether
or not voting with the group is socialized or institutionalized in the Parliament. Coman performs
a different cohesion test: only looking at roll call votes where European groups and national
governments differed in their recommendations to MEPs on how to vote. In this scenario, the
MEP is an actor responding to demands from two different sources. However, he found that
while certain characteristics of MEPs correlated with higher deviation (Western countries during
his period of analysis voted with their political group rather than country more often in times of
tension) political group cohesion was relatively high across the board, this “intrinsic unity of the
party group is a function of ideological homogeneity and learned norms of collective
behavior”. 52 By linking political group cohesion to learning the norms of Parliament and fitting
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ideologically into one’s political group, Coman implies that newer parties, as well as ones who
are ideological outliers in their political group, should more frequently be tempted to vote against
the political group.
Another argument, by Faas, locates MEPs loyalty to political groups in the political
group’s ability to help the MEP in their three central goals: re-election, office (election to
committee in the EP) and legislative results for their constituents. Political groups cannot make
credible threats not to re-elect MEPs, but they do have sway in committee assignments and
positions. Given that the national party often has more proximate control of a MEP’s future, Faas
argues that the tension between national party and political group can lead MEPs to abandon
their political group. Looking at a database of roll call votes from the European Parliament, Faas
finds that national parties which are Eurosceptic, monitor their MEPs closely, are in national
government, or have centralized methods of candidate selection are more likely to defect from
political group, though he gives only brief causal explanation as to why these factors lower
cohesion. 53
Other authors have found or emphasized different characteristics of defectors from
political groups. Lindstaedt et al. peg defection levels in roll call votes to “newness” in the
Parliament. Like Coman, they argue that a new political group will be less experienced in
“whipping” members into voting with them, and therefore lose members inclined to vote along
national party lines. Unlike Coman, however, their data (roll call votes from MEPs in the 20042009 session) also indicates that new MEPs from countries that have more recently joined the
EU are more likely to defect, perhaps because they have not yet realized the collective benefits
from effective political groups. 54 Looking at roll call votes from 2004-2005, Coman, in sharp
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contrast, argues that MEPs from Central and Eastern countries were more likely to stay with their
political group, positing that this is likely because they have not yet managed the dual pressures
between national and political group. 55
Jensen and Spoon argue that most studies of voting patterns of the Parliament are
misleading since they treat parties as an aggregate or monolithic entity, without failing to
highlight how different types of parties have vastly different voting patterns. They look at niche
parties specifically, and compare the roll call votes of four party families (including the “anti-EU
family”) to a study by Hix that looks at voting patterns of all parties. They argue that niche
parties (non mainstream) respond to institutional stimuli differently than mainstream parties, but
also that there is more variation in voting within these niche party families than in more
mainstream ones. For example, the regionalist party family switched to more anti-EU voting
because of a Parliamentary rule change which they saw as destabilizing, while mainstream
parties did not react in such a way to the rule change. In other words, an institutional change to
EP Parliament rules made niche parties change voting strategies in a way that mainstream parties
did not. They also claim niche parties in government tend to be more pro-EU than those not in
national government. They also point out that niche parties tend to switch political group more,
and also find anti-EU voting patterns from MEPs in pro-EU niche parties. 56
Several authors have examined whether different ideological beliefs have been an
obstacle to more meaningful cooperation for Eurosceptic parties specifically. Taggart and
Szczerbiak, for example, distinguish between “Hard” and “Soft” Euroscepticism. Hard
Eurosceptics largely reject the entire Eurosceptic project and oppose their country remaining in
the EU. Soft Eurosceptics have a more qualified opposition to European integration. The authors
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bases these distinctions on the idea that political outsiders will use Eurosceptic rhetoric to further
place themselves outside the political system, but may not actually believe in or want
Eurosceptic actions passed. 57 The difference in commitment to opposing integration could be a
partial explanation for why Eurosceptic parties vote against each other. Whitaker and Lynch also
point to different levels of Euroscepticism as influencing participation and voting patterns in the
Parliament. They first note that the EFDD even in rhetoric is diverse on views towards
integration, and that the ECR also contains a mix of hard and soft Eurosceptics. They
hypothesize that hard Eurosceptics will care less about legislative activity (participating and
attending less) because they will not be able to leverage votes to leave the EU anyway. Soft
Eurosceptics may be more likely to care about legislative affairs. 58 Other authors believe that
Eurosceptic and populist parties’ ideological differences have led to problems.
Another categorical reason for lack of unity pointed to in the literature is lack of
institutionalization of populist and Eurosceptic parties. Mudde notes that many populist parties
have low levels of institutionalization: they have leaders with cults of personality, who tend to
clash with the leaders of other nation’s populists. 59
Rather than trying to examine the behavior of entire Eurosceptic parties, Brack examines
behavior on an individual MEP level. She first notes that the Parliament environment is
structured around compromise between factions: its rules do not make it particularly conducive
for principled opposition to the EU. These rules also fit Eurosceptic MEPs into one of three
molds. They can choose to be an absentee MEP, who rarely involves themselves in
Parliamentary business and spends most of their time campaigning at home. They could also be a
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‘public orator’ who mainly uses the EP space for publicity, using speaking time to highlight the
nonconformity and policy positions without making any serious attempts to pass legislation.
Lastly, they could act as ‘the pragmatist’, making use of their MEP status to actually get
involved in Parliamentary affairs and involve themselves in many legislative activities. 60 Brack’s
different models for how Eurosceptic MEPs may conceive of their roles may help provide a
causal explanation for why there is internal differences within parties, as well as why parties vote
differently. However, she does not link this analysis to a larger explanation of why certain parties
may contain more of one ‘type’ of MEP than another.
There is a general consensus among scholars that Eurosceptic parties tend to be a
heterogeneous group. Because of these, Startin declares that classifying Eurosceptic parties has
been a “definitional minefield”. 61 These difficulties have perhaps contributed to a relative lack of
analysis on Eurosceptics in the European Parliament, but there have been some attempts to
characterize their existence and decision-making there.
The literature on voting cohesion provides several explanations for why Eurosceptic
parties may diverge from their political group and the other national parties within it. First,
however, it is important to establish that this is not just a feature of niche party families. This
leads to hypothesis 2.
Hypothesis 2: Eurosceptic niche parties will cooperate the same amount as other niche party
families.
Jensen and Spoon suggest that niche parties in the Parliament act differently as a category
than mainstream parties. 62 While this would not explain why Eurosceptic parties choose not to
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consolidate into one Parliamentary group, it suggests that niche party status could meaningfully
affect voting behavior, perhaps by making them less likely to cooperate. Under this hypothesis,
lack of Eurosceptic voting cooperation could be entirely (or partly) a function of their status as a
niche party, rather than relating to their members or ideological beliefs. In order to check the
whether this hypothesis is true I measure whether Eurosceptic parties generally cooperate less
(during votes on legislation) than other niche parties.
The fourth chapter of this thesis also goes on to evaluate the role of ideology in difference
in voting patterns of Eurosceptic parties. The three hypotheses look at how ideological different
disagreements discussed in the literature above may lower voting cohesion.
Hypothesis 3: If a Eurosceptic party in the Parliament is populist then it will cooperate less
frequently with non-populist Eurosceptic parties.
Divisions between Eurosceptic parties that are populist and those that are not could also
affect national parties’ choices regarding voting strategy. A populist party may be less willing to
coordinate votes with other parties, or make concessions or compromises when it differs with
coalition partners. Also, since a component of populism is an antipluralism that frequently labels
those who disagree as the enemy, or see disagreement as a threat, populists may for strategic or
ideological reasons be unable to compromise. Because of this, populism is examined as a cause
of disunity among Eurosceptic parties, both to see if populist parties appear less willing to
coordinate with all partners and to see if populists work better with other populist parties.
To classify current parties as populist, I relied on Müller’s definition described earlier. I
then use categorizations of other academics, corroborated with stories and statements from the
press and party documents to identify current populist parties in the European Parliament. By
using a database of EP roll call votes, I can track the number of votes where two parties voted the
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same way during the most recent Parliament. Using this database, I compare the cooperation rate
of populist Eurosceptic parties to Eurosceptic parties that are not populist. I provide a secondary
measure of cooperation using data from VoteWatch Europe, which provides measures of
individual national party loyalty to political group. Lastly, I examine whether populists tend to
agree with each other more in the Eurosceptic political groups in order to see if there is a clear
division on votes between populist and non-populist parties.

Hypothesis 4: If a Eurosceptic party holds a position on the left-right ideological spectrum, then
the party will vote less frequently with Eurosceptic parties that differ significantly from this
position.
Another variable worth considering is the positioning of Eurosceptic parties on a leftright spectrum. Most of this paper looks at Eurosceptic parties who are centrist to far-right, since
the lack of cohesion and political group formation with far-left Eurosceptics seems easily
explained. However, policy and ideological differences caused by smaller deviations in
Eurosceptic parties’ placement on a liberal-conservative scale could be a significant driver of
disunity. For example, differences on national party position on immigration could drive national
parties to vote different ways on immigration-related legislation. I use placement on the Chapel
Hill Electoral Survey to measure the placement of parties on the left-right ideological spectrum. I
then use the Clarin database and VoteWatch Europe database of European Parliament RCVs to
track the number of votes where two Eurosceptic parties voted the same way during the most
recent Parliament.

Hypothesis 5: If a Eurosceptic party has a “soft” stance on Euroscepticism, then it will cooperate
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less frequently with Eurosceptic parties with a “hard” stance.
As pointed to in the literature, even Eurosceptic parties may be against European
integration to different extents, or prioritize it as an issue to greater and lesser extents. This is a
dimension which should be considered distinct from parties positions on a left-right spectrum.
Applying Taggart and Szczerbiak’s analysis, a “soft” Eurosceptic party might be willing to vote
for policies that extend European integration, or help the EU, since its anti-EU stance may have
been largely a tool to win anti-system voters or capture the protest vote. A “hard” Eurosceptic
could be expected to vote differently since these parties have an ideological rather than rhetorical
campaign against the EU. Because of this, Eurosceptic parties may have different voting patterns
depending on the extent to which they prioritize EU integration as a central issue. It is
conceivable that a “Eurosceptic” party may vote in a pro-EU direction if it also endorses or
supports some other aspect of their platform or priorities.
Hard and soft Eurosceptics can be classified by looking at the Chapel Hill Electoral
Survey “EU Position” and “EU Salience” scores, and checking the validity of these scores with
accounts from the press and analysis of other academics. My verification of the validity of the
CHES classifications sometimes results in changes to expected classification: for example while
the Five Star Movement has scores on EU Position and EU Salience that might make
classification as a Hard Eurosceptic party expected, Franzosi et al. make a compelling argument
that the party likely has strategic rather than ideological interests in maligning the EU. 63 Similar
to the last two hypotheses, I use the Clarin and VoteWatch Europe database to measure
differences in voting between Eurosceptic parties.
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I also look at cohesion rates on specific voting issues that are frequently important to soft
Eurosceptic parties, such as development, to see if a divide is heightened. Lastly, I examine the
relationship between the Five Star Movement and UKIP in the EFDD to illustrate divisions that
are probably due to degree of anti-EU sentiment.
The last factor that explains voting cohesion that I test is institutionalization, which I
explore in Chapter 5. This is flagged as a potential motivator of disunity within political groups
by multiple authors.
Hypothesis 6: If the political group or national party make-up of Eurosceptic structures in the
Parliament is uninstitutionalized, then it will have great difficulty coordinating votes.
There are two dimensions of institutionalization that the literature seems to suggest may
factor into Eurosceptic voting cooperation. The first is an examination of how well-structured the
political group itself is. This possibility is raised by from the work of authors like Lindstaedt et
al., who peg voting loyalty to the “newness” of the political group, and the effectiveness of
disciplinary measures like whipping within it. If political leadership is lacking and typical
mechanisms to coordinate votes are not developed that could be a larger contributor to disunity
than actual ideological disputes.
It is also worth considering whether Eurosceptic parties tend to be unstable and vote less
often together within the Parliament largely because the parties themselves are
uninstitutionalized. Lack of structure or leadership for a party could mean a higher likelihood of
incoherent policy or ideology, internal political fissures, or lack of experience in how to
maximize utility in institutions like the European Parliament. Political groups like S&D, by
contrast, include many parties that have been around for some time, but also have decades of
experience in the European Parliament. Lack of institutionalization as a cause for populist
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disunity is hinted at by Mudde when he talks about the low levels of infrastructure and
coordination between parties. The same could be true for Eurosceptic parties as a category.
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Chapter 3
This chapter discusses how concerns about the reputation of parties affect the national
parties’ decision-making process when choosing coalition partners in the European Parliament.
Specifically it addresses hypothesis 1, which suggests that if a Eurosceptic party is seen as
disreputable or politically toxic, then other Eurosceptic parties will be less willing to work in a
political group with them. There may also be incentives that reward Eurosceptic parties for
allying with less Eurosceptic parties, removing them from dominantly Eurosceptic political
groups. If there is support for this hypothesis, then concerns about allying with certain parties
may make some alliances between Eurosceptic parties impossible and contribute to the fractured
state of Eurosceptic parties in the Parliament. I suggest that both of these dynamics affect the
group choices of Eurosceptic parties more than mainstream ones.
The research in this chapter only pertains to how Eurosceptic parties form political
groups in the Parliament- formalized coalitions which give all included parties time to plan and
conference together. The analysis does not concern whether Eurosceptic parties will vote
together on legislative issues. While it seems plausible that national parties might be concerned
about working with a disreputable group, and thus being associated with that group, it does not
seem a realistic fear that because they vote in the same direction on many issues they will be
substantively linked together in constituents’ minds. In short, this chapter only deals with
dimensions of cooperation relating to political group formation, not cooperation or unity relating
to voting.
I first set out a basic theory of how political group formation is affected by reputational
considerations of other parties. I offer an explanation about how such associations could lead to
negative responses from voters, and why national parties may weigh this more heavily than the
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financial and legislative advantages of a larger political group. I then look at examples of these
strategic considerations affecting political group formation, providing insight into how the
landscape for Eurosceptics has been dominantly shaped by such considerations. Using the case
studies, I provide further analysis about when Eurosceptic parties may “risk” a controversial
coalition, and examine to what extent their fears of constituent backlash may be justified.
Following that section, I look at the opposite situation: when a national party may be
enticed into a political group that does not fit their agenda because they hope to receive benefits
to their reputation or outsized ability to thrive in the Parliament. I examine the cases of Fidesz
and the Danish People’s Party, who remain in the ECR despite being more Eurosceptic than the
majority of parties in the group. I argue that the respectability afforded parties by joining parties
that are mainstream across Europe also disrupts Eurosceptic coalition.
Strategic Avoidance
It is apparent that despite the incentives which push political groups towards greater
membership, they are not willing to take on any member or party just for the sake of size. This is
made clear through how political groups occasionally turn down a national party when it bids for
inclusion, as well as through their willingness to expel members who have been implicated in
financial malfeasance, domestic abuse, and other indecencies. Political groups clearly have
standards, perhaps to varying extents, which call for them to exclude those they see as
unfavorable, even if it is a financial blow.
I argue that this is at least partly because, not least in the case of Eurosceptic parties,
national parties do not see the rewards of such a union as worth the potential embarrassment.
First, for many parties, business in the European Parliament is entirely unimportant
compared to national governance and national elections. As discussed in Chapter 1, the powers
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of the European Parliament, while they have expanded, are still relatively limited. Many parties
will likely calculate that having a slightly larger political group will not be the difference that
allows them to pass meaningful legislation (or block legislation that they oppose). However,
even while the public is generally believed to pay little attention to Parliamentary events,
Parliamentary events and proceedings may still affect a party’s national fortunes in elections.
Most parties will likely want to avoid controversial action in an ultimately “unimportant” arena
that they think will lower their chances of success in more important national elections.
Additionally, at least in some countries, the inclusion of a controversial party in a
political group may not fly under the radar of voters in the way that the normal legislative
business of Parliament does. In many countries following the Parliamentary elections, multiple
media sources reported on the emerging political groups, oftentimes drawing attention to the
histories or polarizing comments of more controversial parties. In the United Kingdom, for
example, The Daily Mail, The Spectator, The Guardian and The Telegraph, as well as multiple
smaller papers all published pieces following the negotiations around political group formation,
many paying particular attention to UKIP, whose status in the new Parliament was the least set. 64
While all Eurosceptic parties may, to some extent, be perceived as “disreputable” by
media, concerns over association certainly apply to them. For one thing, many of these parties
have actively strived to move from being seen as a protest vote or “outsider” party to one that
can be taken seriously by the mainstream. However, in many cases they still battle stigma,
dogged by borderline fascist histories, individual members who make extreme statements and
fear from the public that the parties are racist or would deeply destabilize their nations. For
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example, Marine Le Pen has led a push to detoxify the National Front in France, through actions
like cutting ties with the elder Le Pen after his anti-Semitic comments. 65
An alliance or coalition with a controversial party could reverse forward progress on this
goal. Mudde, among other scholars, argues that parties which have escaped complete isolation or
mistrust in their own countries especially avoid ‘pariah’ parties in the European Parliament, and
are more likely to seek relations with countries that have achieved at least some level of
acceptance in their own country. 66
An agreement to include the Golden Dawn party of Greece in the ENF would, at least on
one level be stabilizing. With more members and another nation state in the political group, the
ENF would be meaningfully further away from the brink of dissolving. However, the National
Front’s consistent lack of interest in any alliance with Golden Dawn indicates that they did not
see these benefits as weighable in comparison to harms of being linked to such an extreme
party. 67 Golden Dawn’s association with neo-Nazism and physical violence in the press seems
like something Le Pen would be especially eager to avoid, in an effort to make her party more
broadly appealing.
Golden Dawn, admittedly, is perceptually toxic enough that no political groups seem
willing to work with them; they are Non-Inscrits. However, more subtle strategic decisions
between Eurosceptic parties have helped shape their incorporation in the European Parliament,
and damaged the chance of creating a unified Eurosceptic group.
Strategic Avoidance: Case Studies
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Likely the most central divide between Eurosceptic parties in the Parliament, which has
implications for other divisions, is the tension between the United Kingdom’s UKIP and
France’s National Front. With the exception of M5S in Italy, these two parties are by far the
largest Eurosceptic groups in Parliament. While the struggle between them around the 2014
Parliamentary elections may have created genuine enmity or bitterness, I argue that fears over
associating with the National Front by UKIP spurred their original competition.
Leading up to the elections, Le Pen was clear that she saw a coalition with UKIP as
possible and desirable. In January 2014, Le Pen stated in an interview that FN and UKIP were
“closer than they would like to admit”. 68 She echoed this sentiment in April of that year, noting
that her party had different views on the economy than UKIP, but in most areas their views were
the same. Le Pen specifically highlighted the similarity between the parties regarding their views
on the European Union, saying, “if Farage appreciated how serious the EU’s situation is, he
would support the collaboration of all patriotic movements”. 69
The comments were widely viewed as a sign that Le Pen hoped to form a partnership
with UKIP, specifically in the Parliament which was in the process of forming political groups.
Geert Wilders, who had agreed to sit with Le Pen in the Parliament expressed admiration for
Farage in an interview and openly said he hoped UKIP would join them in the Parliament. 70
The reaction of UKIP leadership, however, made clear they saw joining the National
Front as impossible; there were no indicators to the contrary even when it looked like UKIP
might be locked out of a political group. In an interview in late 2013, Farage stated, “The French
National Front and us come from completely different political traditions and backgrounds. Our
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view is that whatever Marine Le Pen is trying to do with the Front National, anti-Semitism is still
embedded deeply in that party… we are not going to work with them now or at any point in the
future”. 71
In conjunction with pointed comments that he wanted to join parties consistent with
classic liberal democracy, Farage not only communicated a lack of interest in the National Front,
but also a renunciation of them as a party. His comments set up a clear divide between the values
of the National Front and UKIP.
In the same interview, Farage added, “there are going to be Eurosceptics on the far right,
Eurosceptics where we are, Eurosceptics in the Communist Parties that go to the European
Parliament next year, and we don’t intend to get in bed with any of them”. 72 The message of the
statement is that UKIP will not sacrifice any level of its integrity or purity in order to form a
larger or stronger political group. The clear subtext of Farage’s quote is that he prioritizes
adherence to UKIP’s values (which supposedly includes tolerance and equality) over even
temporary or limited alliances with distasteful actors. Rhetoric like this seems likely to actually
reflect UKIP’s strategy regarding who it will form coalitions with, and also sends a message to
Eurosceptics with more “extremist” views to not even try or seriously consider approaching
UKIP.
Ideological divides between the parties do not seem to account for UKIP’s failure to
cooperate with the National Front. UKIP would go on to court Italy’s Five Star Movement, a
party which shared UKIP’s Eurosceptic rhetoric but is significantly farther to the left and sees
many issues, including immigration, differently. Using the Clarin dataset, I also found that UKIP
and the National Front ended up having a majority of their MEPs in agreement on 53.57 percent

71
72

Farage, “Nigel Farage: Ukip will not 'get into bed' with Le Pen,” The Telegraph.
Ibid.

55

of total votes for the time period specified. This was a higher rate of agreement than UKIP
achieved with three of the parties within its political group during that same period, including the
Five Star Movement, notable since this was achieved without formal collaboration or conference
of any sort. While this is still a fairly low rate of cohesion, it demonstrates that shared voting
preferences between UKIP and FN are at least comparable to rates between many Eurosceptic
parties that have agreed to join together.
Personal divides or clashes of personality between party leaders also do not adequately
explain UKIP’s antipathy. In one interview Farage spoke approving of Le Pen, saying she was
bringing her party to new highs. 73 There is also no evidence of ad hominem attacks by either
side, and even two years later Le Pen emphasized the common ground between the two. 74 Such a
comparison seems unlikely if there was genuine dislike between them.
The most likely explanation of UKIP’s failure to cooperate is that it believed that being
connected in British minds with the National Front (and potentially other coalition partners, such
as Wilders’ PVV) would be damaging to its continued electoral prospects. It is accurate to say
that UKIP’s international associations were being watched by media. It also seems plausible that
a connection between FN and UKIP would be commented on by the press, and that the antiSemitic comments of the FN would be linked to UKIP in the public’s mind. As an example of
the dangers of such a coalition, Mason of The Guardian notes that UKIP has sought to project
itself as a party friendly to Muslims. An association with the PVV, which has a reputation for
sometimes virulent Islamophobia could wipe out the credibility of such a stance- indeed Mason
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suspects that Lega Norda’s decision to leave UKIP’s pre-2014 political group was because of
tensions between the two parties on Islam. 75
UKIP’s decision to distance itself from the National Front essentially eliminated any
opportunity to form a sizable group based around a hard Eurosceptic ideology. Both parties
struggled to attract enough support to meet the requirements for a political group, oftentimes
competing for the same coalition partners. In other words, UKIP’s unwillingness to associate
created “sides” for parties with generally Eurosceptic outlooks to divide along. Since National
Front quickly reached agreements with several farther right parties including the PVV and Lega
Norda, and UKIP ended up enticing the sizable Five Star Movement, neither political group
ended up significantly larger, or emerged with a large amount of sway in the Eighth Parliament.
Politics relating to lack of respectability contributed to multiple smaller decisions
regarding the exclusion of national parties from political groups. Despites its willingness to take
in far-right parties such as Austria’s FPÖ, the ENF balked at allowing in Jobbik, perhaps because
it has been accused of anti-Semitism, an accusation the National Front itself is trying to shake. 76
The AfD has vocally disassociated with FN; Frauke Petry interviewed with a German
paper declaring that the AfD has nothing in common with the National Front. 77 This may be
because concerns over anti-Semitism are especially powerful in Germany. A member of the
German Council on Foreign Relations argues that the FN is seen as far right in Germany, and
anti-Semitism “is something you can’t score points with in Germany”. 78
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No set hierarchy of most to least respectable immediately presents itself, rather
adjudications about who is a palatable coalition partner seem variable depending on the
calculations of individual parties or political groups.
Notes on Strategic Avoidance
While I argue above that strategic avoidance of disreputable parties has had large-scale
effects on Eurosceptics’ ability to form a powerful coalition, it is important to note that while
national parties may care foremost about domestic election results, that does not prevent them
from joining with disreputable parties in all circumstances. Many Eurosceptic parties are, to
some degree, maligned in their national press or considered extreme by segments of the public.
While the decision-making processes of when to cooperate may be nuanced, it is difficult to say
whether the majority of Eurosceptic parties make decisions using the same framework, or
whether the decisions they come to are highly variable depending on the ideology of the party
and impulses of the party leadership.
As an example, Poland’s KNP was initially seen as too extremist to join a political group.
Even though the ENF was looking for partners to strengthen their nascent coalition, Wilders
eventually declared that the KNP leader’s comments regarding women’s intelligence and the
Holocaust were not something his party could tolerate. 79 However, one member of KNP joined
the EFDD (generally perceived as more moderate than the ENF). Adding this one member rather
than the entire party was generally believed to be a quiet agreement that allowed the EFDD to
meet the requirements surrounding diversity of member states, but not be associated with all of
the “baggage” of the KNP. While there was some negative press coverage surrounding this, the
addition did not trigger public outrage on a large scale. 80
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The EFDD’s decision to add a member of the KNP to their coalition, despite the fact that
neither they nor the ENF wanted the entire KNP to join suggests that Eurosceptic parties
sometimes do take at least marginal risks in order to strengthen or complete a political group.
Decisions to cooperate with disreputable parties may rely on the Eurosceptic party’s adjudication
of the salience of that party within their country. In other words, the decision-making relies on
the pariah party’s name recognition and reputation among constituents rather than entirely the
content of that party’s views.
So Nigel Farage publicly labelling the National Front as anti-Semitic while tolerating the
presence of a KNP member may be because the National Front is familiar to British voters and
has specific connotations in their mind, while the KNP (a new, small party) likely does not.
While the vehemence of Nigel Farage’s rejection of the National Front suggests he believes
disassociation is important, it is difficult to say whether such a disavowal is actually necessary to
preserve UKIP’s reputation, or whether the coalition of parties would go largely unnoticed by
voters anyway.
Coalitions for Secondary Benefits
In certain circumstances, Eurosceptic parties will move to join political groups that may
not entirely meet their ideology because they expect the association to bolster their international
reputation and support their legitimacy. While this may initially sound like an inverse of the
argument above, there is a distinction. In the Strategic Avoidance section above, I discuss
Eurosceptic parties deliberately acting to avoid parties that have a pariah status or bad reputation.
In this section, I discuss when Eurosceptic parties deliberately seek out coalition with parties or
political groups they expect to have an actively legitimizing effect on how they are perceived. In
the case of Fidesz, this association offers not only perceptual benefits but potentially legal and

59

rhetorical defense by “legitimate” parties from accusers. This analysis differs from the above in
the types of actions and tactics parties pursuing coalitions will take. I argue that it has also had
substantial effect on a unified Eurosceptic front within the Parliament because multiple parties
have pursued these coalitions with more moderate political groups.
The question returns to debates between academics regarding whether national parties
will join political groups because of ideological proximity or expectation of material benefits.
While authors who argue for material benefits as a motivator for joining political groups present
compelling evidence, they frequently consider benefits such as speaking time and funding rather
than secondary benefits such as increased legitimacy as a motivator to join one political group
over another. It may be true that ideological proximity may play a role in some of these cases,
perhaps for parties that use Eurosceptic rhetoric but internally do not care deeply about European
integration. However, I seek to show that at least in some circumstances this is an insufficient
explanation for these parties’ decision to join more mainstream political groups. If nothing else
legitimacy concerns add a second incentive to join these groups.
This analysis also builds on Startin, who claims that Eurosceptic parties may have
incentives to join political groups to show they are capable of international cooperation and
serious politics. 81 In several circumstances Eurosceptic parties deliberately seek out
institutionalized or well-known political groups in order to escape the perception that they are an
“outsider” party that is incapable of effective governance.
Coalitions for Secondary Benefits: Case Studies
The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), in its bid to enter the ECR political group,
appears to have the motivation described above. Formed only in 2013, the EP elections were the
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first success for the AfD. The AfD argued that current European Union economic policy was
unsustainable, and frequently included generally Eurosceptic rhetoric. While in its first years the
AfD was generally not classified as a populist or far-right party (the rupture of the AfD, which
left the party significantly more populist and far right, would not occur until mid-2015), there
was some concern about far-right tendencies of the party from early on, especially on issues
surrounding immigration. 82 Overall, the AfD was a fledgling party that had almost no
institutional experience in government, and at that point had little time or chance to earn the trust
of German voters or larger Europe.
In this context, attempts to gain legitimacy rather than ideological proximity more
convincingly explain the AfD’s bid to join the ECR. While the AfD did not oppose German
membership in the EU, they generally opposed many aspects of European integration, including
the general functioning of the Eurozone. This platform placed them as significantly farther to the
right than many parties in the ECR. The Chapel Hill Electoral Survey includes measures for
political parties on both their attitudes towards European integration and their placement on a
left-right spectrum. I aggregated scores for all political parties in the EFDD and ENF political
group, as well as all parties except for the AfD in the ECR (meaning the table is unweighted in
relation to number of MEPs of each group). The placement of the AfD on both dimensions is
notably closer to the ENF and the EFDD (the more Eurosceptic political groups) than the ECR.
Table 1: AfD Expert Placement in Comparison to Eurosceptic Political Groups
Group

EU Position (1-7)

Left-Right Position (0-10)

AfD

1.61

8.92

ECR (aggregate)

3.82

6.59

ENF (aggregate)

1.50

9.19
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EFDD (aggregate)

1.57

7.74

While one faction of AfD MEPs (the faction that would split from the AfD in 2015)
ended up frequently voting with the political group, with a cohesion rate of 90.61%, the more
populist wing of AfD parliamentarians would vote with the political group at a rate of 69.45%,
one of the lowest cohesion rates of the group.
Lastly, the ECR’s dilemma on whether to let the AfD in at all should indicate that there
were significant differences in agenda or perspective between the AfD and large segments of the
ECR. While members of the ECR used a secret ballot to vote on whether to include the AfD,
reports indicate that the Germany party was allowed in on a 29-26 margin, against the wishes of
David Cameron and most of the Conservative party. 83 The close vote implies there was divided
opinion among the ECR about whether the AfD embodied the values and ethos of the political
group.
While some of the resources provided by a larger political group, such as potentially
greater visibility and funding may have been useful for the AfD, sources suggest that the AfD
bid for the ECR because of the legitimacy and respectability conveyed by being part of an
established political group. An article by Euractiv notes that the AfD was aware of its perception
as a far-right party, and prioritized joining the ECR to try to lose this reputation. AfD founder
Bernd Lucke said that he would “only work together with parties who belong to the moderate
political spectrum”. 84 He also framed the victory as a win against those who did not want the
AfD to be “recognized”. 85 Since the AfD would have no problem entering the EFDD or ENF,
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which were at the time competing to get enough support to form a political group (an avenue
some of the more populist AfD MEPs reportedly wanted to pursue), the AfD’s choice of
coalition partner is best understood as a choice to discount ideology in the name of international,
and potentially domestic, legitimacy.
A similar situation presents itself in the case of the Danish People’s Party. Admittedly,
the DPP is ideologically much closer to the ECR than the AfD. While its stance on EU
integration most closely matched the ENF and EFDD, its measure on the left-right spectrum was
closest to the ECR (see table below). However, the VoteWatch Europe database reveals that
through the end of 2017 the DPP voted with the political group 80.36% of the time- in the
bottom fifth of party cohesion rates for the ECR. This tension makes it slightly difficult to gauge
how close the DPP is to the dominant beliefs of the ECR. Borre and Meret note that while the
DPP was extremely Eurosceptic in the 1990s (running the slogan “nothing above, nothing beside
the Danish Parliament”) they have moderated some in the years since. 86 The DPP does not
advocate complete withdrawal from the European Union.
Table 2: DPP Expert Placement in Comparison to Eurosceptic Political Groups
Group

EU Position (1-7)

Left-Right Position (0-10)

DPP

1.91

6.90

ECR

3.81

6.71

ENF

1.50

9.19

EFDD

1.57

7.74

But while it is difficult to ascertain whether hard Euroscepticism is an ideological stance
or a rhetorical one, details of the party’s pursuit of ECR membership suggest that the DPP sees
perceptual benefits to the group. One DPP candidate spoke of the National Front’s success as
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deplorable- characterizing them as an opportunist party. The implication was that the DPP ought
not be lumped in with other anti-establishment parties, and that it was categorically more
responsible and sophisticated. 87 As a party seeking to become more normalized to the Danish
voter, the DPP moved not only to avoid certain “problem” parties but to symbolically join forces
with institutionalized parties to the best it could. Borre and Meret argue convincingly that the
DPP’s strategy since entering Parliament shows that they are using pragmatic, not ideological,
methods.
The last party worth independent consideration is Fidesz of Hungary, which has long
been a part of the EPP, a fairly centrist political group. While Fidesz is frequently labelled a soft
Eurosceptic party, rare for the EPP, by many indicators it seems likes its agenda for the
Parliament is compatible with the political group. The CHES shows that Fidesz is more opposed
to European integration and farther right than most of the political group (though not as opposed
to EU integration as most Eurosceptic parties examined here), but Fidesz votes with the majority
of the political group in 95.38% of Roll Call Votes. This voting record, along with Fidesz’s long
tenure in the EPP and several other factors have led many to conclude that the party quietly
favors many aspects of the EU even while it publicly rails against it.
But while ideological proximity may be an entirely sufficient explanation for Fidesz’s
presence in the EPP, they are brought up to illustrate another set of benefits potentially available
to populist or Eurosceptic parties who join more moderate groups. Despite the presence of Fidesz
in the EPP, neither its members or the Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán have given any
indication they want to become more mainstream or internationally respected than they already
are- indeed they are in power in Hungary and often use rhetoric that suggests the rest of Europe
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is prejudiced against Hungary and treats the party unfairly. Instead, the benefit to Fidesz is
leveraging its coalition with a large group of moderate national parties to help ameliorate severe
criticism and administrative action by the European Union.
At several points in recent years, Orbán has suggested Hungarian action that is
antithetical to the values and laws of the European Union. In 2015, Orbán put forth the idea that
Hungary should reinstate the death penalty, a direct violation of EU law. 2017 saw Orbán
advocate to punitively regulate or close the Central European University in Hungary, an
institution he associated with George Soros and foreign manipulation in Hungary in general.
Many believe that the EPP’s coalition with Fidesz has incentivized them to act in support
of the nationalist party under circumstances they normally would not. Tim King of Politico notes
that elections for the Presidency of the European Commission turned out in favor of Jean-Claude
Juncker, the center-right candidate. 88 If the center-right (EPP) had fewer MEPs the result could
be different; Fidesz provided 12 MEPs to the EPP. As a very loyal coalition partner, Fidesz has
meaningfully supported the EPP.
The EPP’s reluctance to directly criticize Fidesz is visible both in the death penalty affair
and the controversy surrounding the Central European University in Budapest. While the EPP
put out a statement standing behind the abolition of the death penalty as transnational law, it
made fairly oblique references to Hungary’s stance on the issue, and stated that it expected
Hungary to act reasonably and stay within the law. 89 When asked about unrest in the European
Parliament caused by Orbán’s statements regarding the death penalty, EPP President Joseph
Daul argued that there were other leaders of European nations, such as Ponta of Romania who
arguably caused more unrest. Daul also noted that Orbán had not successfully undercut European
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law, and said “his party, Fidesz, has always voted in line with the EPP in the European
Parliament. Since I have been President of the group, I have always been able to count on
Berlusconi’s Italians and Orbán’s Hungarians to support our position”. 90 The equivalency
between Orbán and other European leaders amounts to a statement that the Hungarian Prime
Minister is not meaningfully different than other European countries. In the context of Fidesz
supporting a reversal of EU law, it seems hard to believe the EPP would be so quick to leap to
the defense of Fidesz if they were not in coalition together. Daul’s characterization of Fidesz as
valuable to the EPP seems to confirm this.
So while most of Orbán’s declarations about reversing or undercutting EU law have been
rolled back, he still gets rhetorical power and attention for raising these issues (as well as the
potential of actually achieving them) while getting some level of support from a large and
generally respected political group.
It is true that Fidesz is not a clear-cut example of a Eurosceptic party joining a political
group in order to be shielded: there is little evidence to suggest that was their original motivation
back in 2000. However, political ties to EPP figures do seem to have benefitted Fidesz by giving
them institutional allies. The protection and political support enabled by membership in a
dominant political group may create incentives for other Eurosceptic groups to mimic this tactic
in the future.
Coalitions for Secondary Benefits: Notes
Other parties with soft Eurosceptic views have also joined political groups with
minimally Eurosceptic views, such as the populist Perussuomalaiset (True Finns) party.
Eurosceptic parties’ decision to operate in such a way has substantial effect on the options of
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Eurosceptic parties who choose not to join moderate political groups, or are refused entry. There
are certainly potential benefits to the “moderating” Eurosceptic party; besides the potential
positive effects regarding legitimacy, they also are eligible for more speaker time, potentially
valued committee positions, and Parliamentary funding. If they are in a political group that is
heavily institutionalized, and votes in set and coordinated ways, they may face significant
pressure to vote with the political group. However, the party does retain the right to vote against
the party line as it sees fit (which the AfD and DPP utilized).
However, flight into more moderate political groups does hamper Eurosceptic
cooperation. On the obvious level, the parties that move there in many cases will be outvoted and
have little chance to convince their coalition partners to always vote in the “Eurosceptic”
direction. But their flight also leaves fewer Eurosceptic parties available to form a Eurosceptic
political group. With stringent rules regarding the number of Member States and MEPs required
for a group, and an almost zero-sum competition between the National Front and UKIP to attract
Eurosceptic parties, this departure is a meaningful one. The political groups that eventually
formed are smaller and less powerful than they would be if more Eurosceptic parties
deprioritized party standing and legitimacy and instead moved to the political group that was the
most ideologically proximate.
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Chapter 4
The previous chapter examined the process by which Eurosceptic parties, once elected,
form political groups. It focused on the strategic decisions parties must make when deciding who
to accept as a coalition partner, and the possible domestic ramifications of these decisions. This
chapter examines a different aspect of cooperation in the Parliament: voting cohesion. Most of
the chapter focuses on national parties’ willingness to vote with the line or agenda of the larger
political group. This involves a different set of factors than the previous chapter- there is no
reputational harm in voting the same way as a maligned party. But examinations of party
cohesion help understand when and under what circumstances Eurosceptics parties may be
willing to sacrifice or compromise in order to vote with their political group.
The first hypothesis of this chapter looks at Eurosceptic voting rates in relation to other
niche party families, in order to see if Eurosceptic cooperation is actually lower than other nonmainstream or marginalized ideologies. The next three hypotheses test what ideological party
attributes seem to affect voting cooperation.

Hypothesis 2: Eurosceptic niche parties will cooperate the same amount as other niche party
families.
This hypothesis functions as something of a null hypothesis to the overall premise of this
paper. Most of my framework relies on the argument that right-wing Eurosceptic parties, despite
presumably having a largely shared agenda, are unable to cooperate together in Parliament.
However, this would be the wrong question if this was not a feature especially true of this
political group. Jensen and Spoon, as mentioned in Chapter 2, argue that different niche party
families may act in similar ways in the European Parliament. While the ways niche party
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families act may be different than mainstream party families, there are patterns of behavior
between these niche party families regardless of ideology or values: they respond to
“institutional stimuli” in the same way. Jensen and Spoon do not particularly focus on niche
party cooperation with political groups, and it is also possible their original analysis is no longer
applicable to parties in the Parliament today (their work focuses on parties within the Parliament
from 1979 to 2004). But if the results they found were accurate for today’s Parliament with
regards to loyalty to political group, that would offer significant problems for the idea that
Eurosceptics have lower rates of cooperation than other coalitions within Parliament.
Multiple aggregations of political group cohesion show that the most Eurosceptic
political groups have the lowest total cohesion scores (Table 1, from VoteWatch Europe, is one
such aggregation). However, this does not necessarily imply that Eurosceptics are less loyal or
cooperative than other niche party families: national parties from other niche party families could
just be fewer in number or distributed across multiple political groups, so their lack of
cooperation is less noticeable in aggregate.
Table 1: Overall Political Group Cohesion
Political Group

Overall Group Cohesion

GUE-NGL

82.76%

Greens-EFA

95.46%

S&D

92.28%

ALDE

88.62%

EPP

93.33%

ECR

78.51%

EFDD

48.51%

ENF

74.05%
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To try to see if niche party families within the Parliament have systematically low
cooperation with political group, I selected four niche party families for examination. Altering
Jensen and Spoon’s selection somewhat, I pick the Eurosceptic right, Eurosceptic left,
Regionalist and Green parties as niche party families within the Parliament.
The selection process for what constitutes a Eurosceptic right party has already been
extensively discussed in Chapter 2. To select Eurosceptic left parties, I rely on a list of left-wing
Eurosceptic parties running for election in the 2014 EP Parliament provided by Hobolt. 91 All of
these parties fall within the GUE-NGL. It should be noted that Hobolt may be using a more
permissive structure for what qualifies as a “Eurosceptic left” party. However, if anything this is
likely to allow for a more ideologically diverse group to fall in this party family, making it more
likely that their cohesion rates will be lower.
To classify parties as regionalist, I used a synthesis of several sources to create a list. 92
Regionalist parties were the most dispersed, falling in five different political groups. In order to
mark national parties as Green and belonging to the Green party family, I used a list of parties
that are in the European Green Party (EGP). The EGP is a larger political party that operates and
supports a collection of green parties across Europe. All of the current EGP national parties that
are currently in the European Parliament are in the Greens-EFA political group.
The four tables below show cooperation rates for each of these four niche party families.
The middle column labelled “mean loyalty” shows the cooperation rate calculated from the
Clarin data set, where each national party’s rate of agreement with other parties in its political
group is taken and aggregated. The right column “PG loyalty” is taken from VoteWatch Europe,
where the party is considered loyal in a vote if it votes with the plurality of the rest of the
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political group. I include the rates of cooperation for all the political groups for each party family
(if there is more than one political group) and a “total” row where the mean from each individual
party’s cooperation rate is taken (bolded). I also include a column that drops the highest and
lowest national party cooperation scores, to ensure that the results are not due to one highly
coordinated (or uncoordinated) outlier.

Table 2: Eurosceptic Party Family Loyalty
Grouping

Mean Loyalty

PG Loyalty

ECR

0.85

0.63

EFDD

0.61

0.43

ENF

0.63

0.52

EPP

0.81

0.93

Total mean

0.56

0.72

Total high/low mean dropped

0.56

0.72

Table 3: Eurosceptic Left Party Family Loyalty (GUE-NGL)
Mean Loyalty

PG Loyalty

GUE-NGL Mean

0.73

0.88

GUE-NGL high/low mean dropped

0.73

0.89

Table 4: Regionalist Party Family Loyalty
Grouping

Mean Loyalty

PG Loyalty

Greens-EFA total

0.81

0.96

EPP total

0.86

0.96

ALDE total

0.75

0.90

GUE-NGL total

0.74

0.89

ENF total

0.53

0.53

ECR total

0.55

0.89

Total mean

0.76

0.91
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Total high/low mean dropped

0.772814756

0.931625

Table 5: Green Party Family Loyalty (Greens-EFA)
Grouping

Mean Loyalty

PG Loyalty

Greens-EFA Mean

0.83

0.97

Greens-EFA high/low mean dropped

0.83

0.97

In comparison to the other party families, the Eurosceptic party family has notably lower
scores. Using the mean loyalty cooperation metric, mean agreement with other parties is fifteen
percent lower for Eurosceptic parties than for any other niche party family. Using the “PG
Loyalty” metric, loyalty among Eurosceptic political groups is sixteen percent lower. In both
instances, the next lowest cooperation rates for party families are on the Eurosceptic left. The
data seems to support a theory that conservative Eurosceptics in particular have trouble
cooperating with their political group, beyond the extent that other niche parties do.
There are two other interesting results from testing this hypothesis. First, the data
suggests that dispersion of a party family across multiple political groups is not the full story
behind low Eurosceptic cooperation with involved political groups. Regionalist national parties
are also spread out over multiple political groups as well, and these political groups might be
more or less devoted to regionalist issues. But with the exception of Lietuvos Lenku Rinkimu
Akcija in the ECR and Lega Nord (also a Eurosceptic party) in the ENF, the level of cooperation
with political group is relatively high. So while dispersion across multiple political groups may
be a factor involved in Eurosceptic disunity, it is clearly not a sufficient factor for extremely low
cooperation. Both “mean loyalty” and “PG loyalty” are higher for regionalists than the
Eurosceptic left, despite the fact that the Eurosceptic left is clustered in one political group and
could conceivable have more control of the agenda or direction of the political group.
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Secondly, cooperation levels for party families vary by group. For example, the mean
loyalty score for Eurosceptics in the ECR is the highest for political groups of any niche party
family. Additionally, the mean loyalty and PG loyalty scores for Eurosceptics in the EPP are also
quite high. This is not enough to significantly affect the total means, since there are only two
parties in the EPP. However, it does suggest that placement within a political group may affect or
predict level of cooperation more than any other factors. The role of political group in
determining loyalty is returned to later.
Overall, it seems likely that while there may be impacts of being a niche party family in
the European Parliament which shape behavior in certain ways, this does not mean that all niche
parties have exactly the same pressures or modes of behavior. The Eurosceptic right very clearly
does not vote with their political groups as much. Because of this, it is appropriate to continue
with the rest of the hypotheses which break down this low cohesion further. These hypotheses,
while not always offering verifiable causal mechanisms that lead to low Eurosceptic cohesion,
delve into fault lines within the Eurosceptic right and begin to offer reasons and explanations for
why these cleavages occur.

Hypothesis 3: If a Eurosceptic party in the Parliament is populist then it will cooperate less
frequently with non-populist Eurosceptic parties.
Parties with a Eurosceptic outlook in the European Parliament frequently are considered
populist as well. The tension between these two attributes is worthy of scrutiny. It seems
plausible that populists as a whole might have lower voting cooperation in the Parliament. Since
by Müller’s definition populism requires antipluralist rhetoric which labels opposition figures as
the enemy of the people, populist parties might rely on the same strategy or belief while in the
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Parliament: frequently voting against their political group and justifying it by saying their
national party alone works to help the people of their country. However, the individualism
usually associated with populism has potential to clash with Euroscepticism: for many of these
Eurosceptic parties they are surrounded by other parties with a purportedly similar goal of
slowing or stopping EU integration. If that is really their goal, populists may be as in favor as
non-populists to vote with their political group.
Due to this uncertainty, I examine presence or absence of populism within Eurosceptic
parties specifically to see if populism is a driver of disunity among Eurosceptic parties. I test
both whether populist parties appear less willing to coordinate with all partners in their political
group, but also whether populist parties tend to vote more frequently with other populist parties.
To be clear, all quantitative data refers only to parties that are Eurosceptic, not populist parties
that do not share this ideology.
As described in the previous chapter, I use Müller’s definition of populism. A
classification scheme showing which Eurosceptic parties are classified as populist is available in
Table 2 of the Appendix, Table 2 also classifies these parties on a left to right spectrum and as
“hard” or “soft” Eurosceptics (relevant for the next two hypotheses).
To calculate cooperation, I again used the mean loyalty and PG loyalty measures from
hypothesis 2. Using the PG loyalty metric, for example, I took the mean of all means of populist
parties’ cohesion rates to their political group. I then took the mean of all means for non-populist
parties’ cohesion rates.
Table 6: Overall Populist and Non-Populist Loyalty to Political Group
Mean Loyalty

PG Loyalty

Populist

0.56

0.75

Non-populist

0.62

0.81
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When aggregated, the hypothesis appears to be strongly supported. Both measures of
cooperation show that rates for non-populist Eurosceptics on roll call votes are much higher. By
each measure, the cohesion rate for non-populists is about seven percent higher than populist
parties. This suggests that populist parties have cooperated less on roll call votes than nonpopulist parties, and that the presence of this attribute may help answer the question of why
Eurosceptic cooperation is low.
However, when these figures are divided by political group, the situation becomes more
complicated. The tables below show how populist and non-populist parties compare in each
political group on the two measures of cooperation.

Table 7: Loyalty to Political Group by Populism (VoteWatch)
Grouping

Populist

Non-populist

ENF

0.58

N/A

EFDD

0.61

0.73

ECR

0.88

0.83

EPP

0.95

0.91

Total PG loyalty

0.75

0.81

Table 8: Mean Loyalty by Populism (Clarin database)
Grouping

Populist

Non-populist

ENF

0.52

N/A

EFDD

0.41

0.50

ECR

0.68

0.66

EPP

0.90

0.72

Total mean loyalty

0.56

0.62
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While populist parties as a whole have a lower mean, this is true of only half the political
groups. By either measure, the cooperation level of populists is actually higher than nonpopulists in the ECR and EPP. Additionally, loyalty is much greater in these two political groups
for both populists and non-populists than either group in the EFDD or ENF.
These results are partially explained by the number of each type of party. The EPP has
only two Eurosceptic parties, so that score is a one to one comparison. There are also only two
populist parties in the ECR. The EFDD only has two non-populist parties, and the ENF has none.
This helps explain why the total mean has populists cooperating so much less: though they
cooperate more often in half the relevant political groups, there are many more uncooperative
ones in the EFDD and ENF.
However, this breakdown offers challenges to the hypothesis. While the cooperative
populist parties in the EPP and ECR are not a large number in total, at a minimum they show that
presence of populism is not a sufficient factor for a party to have low cooperation. Within these
political groups, the national parties appear to vote with the majority to a greater extent than the
non-populist Eurosceptic ones.
Secondly, the tables seem to suggest that Eurosceptic parties will have varying rates of
cooperation due to the political group they are in: this appears as a stronger correlation than the
presence or absence of populism. The lowest “mean loyalty” score for a Eurosceptic party in the
ECR is .60, the highest for the EFDD is .52. It is entirely possible that populists tend to select
into the least coordinated political groups, and it is the presence of a large number of populists
that makes these political groups so dysfunctional. However, while the data does not contradict
this possibility, it does not verify it either. An in-depth look at all of the factors in play in the
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Parliament, supported by regression analysis, might allow for the isolation of populism/nonpopulism as a factor. However, such an in-depth project is not attempted here.
I also tested whether presence or absence of populism was a point of cleavage within
political groups. If populist parties frequently voted with populist parties, and non-populists with
non-populists, that would suggest that an important point of division within these political groups
was this attribute. For example, populists within a political group might be resisting the political
group line in the same way.
For each national party, I calculated their mean rates of agreement with other national
parties from their political group that shared their characteristic (presence or absence of
populism). I then took the mean of these rates on both the political group and total level.
Secondly, I calculated each party’s mean rate of agreement with parties that were the opposite of
their characteristic. This allowed me to see the rate at which populist parties were voting the
same direction as non-populist ones. If populist parties tended to vote together and non-populist
parties tended to vote together, or if the mixed rate of cooperation was low, the data would
support the idea that voting in political groups was sometimes on populist vs non-populist lines.

Table 9: Populist Agreement with Other Populists
Grouping

Mean loyalty

Number of relevant parties

ENF

0.52

5

EFDD

0.34

3

ECR

0.74

2

Table 10: Non-populist Agreement with Other Non-populists
Grouping

Mean loyalty

Number of relevant parties

EFDD

0.78

2

ECR

0.70

4
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Table 11: Mixed Populist/non-populist Cooperation Rates
Grouping

Mean loyalty

Number of relevant parties

EFDD

0.46

5

ECR

0.73

6

EPP

0.73

2

While for some political groups the number of relevant parties is disappointingly small,
the data recorded does not indicate that there is a consistent cleavage between populist and nonpopulists within their political groups. The ECR has similar rates for all three categories,
suggesting that if there are “populist issues” that populists tend to vote the same way on in
opposition to non-populists, these make up a very small fraction of overall votes. The closest
thing to confirmation of this idea is the EFDD, where non-populist Eurosceptics vote together at
a very high rate for that political group. However since this result does not seem to be repeated, it
does not seem appropriate to argue that a split between populists and non-populists clearly
divides the parties in political groups.

Hypothesis 4: If a Eurosceptic party holds a position on the left-right ideological spectrum, then
the party will vote less frequently with Eurosceptic parties that differ significantly from this
position.
Many Eurosceptic parties generally are considered center or far right. However, there is
some variation, even within political groups. Italy’s Five Star Movement, for example, is given a
4.66 on a 0 (left) to 10 (right) scale on the Chapel Hill Electoral Survey (though it is still
generally classified as right-wing Eurosceptic). For this hypothesis, I focus less on whether
certain points on the left-right ideological spectrum correlate with higher cooperation, this seems
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likely to be fruitless since one’s position on the spectrum could be an asset or a detriment
depending on the composition and overall placement of the political group as a whole. Rather I
seek to see whether lack of agreement between Eurosceptics on voting issues usually plays out
along left-right lines, or whether they are generally able to put these issues aside to vote together
as a Eurosceptic bloc.
Because breaking down party positions to individual left-right issues (like immigration or
gay rights) would be a difficult task, I instead place national parties on the left-right spectrum
using the Chapel Hill Electoral Survey (the variable is lrgen). Parties with a score of 8 or more
are considered ‘far right’, a score of 5-8 is right, and a score of 5 or less should be considered
center/center left.
Because the meaning and interpretation of lrgen scores is highly dependent on the
specific political group, an aggregate for each of these categories is of limited use, however I
provide an overview below to give readers an overall picture.
Table 12: Overall Left-Right Political Group Loyalty
Mean Loyalty PG Loyalty
lrgen 8+

0.56

0.74

lrgen 5-8

0.68

0.86

lrgen<5

0.52

0.72

The two tables below are separated by the measure of cooperation being used. Each table
breaks cooperation rates down by political group, for ‘far right’ parties (8-10) and not far right
parties (less than 8). The political groups are listed from the most (ENF) to least (EPP) right
wing.

Table 13: Left-right Loyalty to Political Group (VoteWatch)
Grouping

Far right

Not far right
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ENF

.69

N/A

EFDD

.73

.61

ECR

.81

.88

EPP

N/A

.93

Table 14: Left-right Mean Loyalty to Political Group (Clarin database)
Grouping

Far right

Not far right

ENF

.52

N/A

EFDD

.48

.40

ECR

.67

.66

EPP

N/A

.81

The most important sections of the table above are the EFDD and ENF. The EFDD, by
either measure, has a relatively higher rate for far right parties. The ECR has higher rates of
cooperation by either measure. According to the “PG Loyalty” metric, non far right parties vote
with the political line much more of the time, while the “mean loyalty” metric puts the rates at
about even. While the rates being the same by this metric is surprising, there is still some support
to the idea that the more center right political group enables higher rates of cooperation among
parties that are not far right. A possibility is that Eurosceptics must sometimes choose between
political group and their preferred placement on the left-right spectrum. When a political group’s
mean is close to that ideal point, they will be able to vote with the political group a greater
amount of the time. Those whose position on the left-right spectrum differ from most of their
coalition partners must either deal with the dissonance or vote against the political group. These
results, particularly from the EFDD, suggest that they will sometimes choose the latter.
Looking at the cooperation rates for the EPP and ENF supports the idea that the political
groups feature voting issues involving the left-right spectrum. While there are no far right
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Eurosceptics in the EPP, the cooperation rate for ‘not far right’ parties is quite high, suggesting
that the ideological consensus of the political group matches those of ‘not far right’ parties. The
same is true for the ENF: especially for a political group with such low cohesion the rates of
agreement are relatively high. Since the group has a higher make-up of far right parties, they
more rarely have to choose between political group and left-right ideological positioning. They
will more rarely defy the political group and other national parties.
Demonstrating that far right parties tend to vote with far right parties and center-right
tend to vote with center-right would go further in demonstrating that some of the divisions
between Eurosceptic parties are because they disagree on an ideological level on some issues.
While obviously I do not go through each vote to track whether it is a left vs right voting issue,
high rates on the tables below would suggest that parties do vote along left/right ideological lines
on these issues.
The tables below, similar to those in hypothesis 3, provide the rates of cooperation that
each group on the lrgen (left-right) spectrum has with other parties in that grouping on the
spectrum from their political group. Center/center left is excluded since none of the political
groups has more than one national party with a lrgen score less than five. However, the final
table includes parties with these scores in its representation of far right parties’ cooperation rates
with non far right parties.

Table 15: Far Right Parties Agreement with Other Far Right Parties (lrgen 8+)
Grouping

Mean NP loyalty

Number of Parties

ENF

0.52

5

EFDD

0.62

3

ECR

0.71

3
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Total

0.53

11

Table 16: Right Parties Agreement with Other Right Parties (lrgen 5-8)
Grouping

Mean NP loyalty

Number of Parties

EFDD

0.28

2

ECR

0.71

3

Total

0.54

5

Table 17: Mixed: Far-right/non Far-right Cooperation Rates
Grouping

Mean NP loyalty

Number of Parties

EFDD

0.45

5

ECR

0.72

6

Total

0.60

11

Interestingly, the tables do not offer much support for the idea that these political groups
have consistent multi-party cleavages along the left-right ideological spectrum. For this to be
proved conclusively, one would expect high rates of voting together in the first two tables above,
and relatively lower rates for the third. While the low rate of agreement between the two ‘right’
parties in the EFDD can be discounted as an outlier, due to the low number of parties, none of
the results particularly fit this prediction. The rate of agreement with other national parties is the
highest for both the ECR and the total.
Despite the results, the tables from earlier in this hypothesis do suggest at least a strong
possibility that voting in Eurosceptic political groups may be shaped by left-right concerns,
rather than just opposition to European integration. Furthermore, this would hold true with both
past theory and the logic of party decision-making as presented here. One possibility for the
above results is that while parties at different points in the left-right spectrum do vote against the
political group based on left-right concerns, each individual national party prioritizes different
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issues that it will differ with the group on. For example, one party might only break with most of
the other party lines because they hold to more liberal economic values, while another party
might break with the other parties because of more liberal social values. This would mean that
they do not have high rates of agreement between them, despite breaking with the political group
line frequently, because they choose to go their own way on different votes.

Hypothesis 5: If a Eurosceptic party has a “soft” stance on Euroscepticism, then it will cooperate
less frequently with Eurosceptic parties that have a harder stance.
As explained in the second chapter, there is a second dimension to politics in the
European Parliament, specifically dealing with feelings towards the European Union. While
Eurosceptics, as defined, have an oppositional view towards the EU, they can be separated into
“hard” and “soft” Eurosceptics to differentiate their level of investment in exiting or completely
opposing the EU and its institutions. Similar to how populism and left-right positionality are
examined, I examine the hard/soft status of Eurosceptic national parties to determine whether the
level of opposition to EU integration is a significant point of cleavage or disagreement for
Eurosceptics in the Parliament.
The first table below shows the aggregate rates of political group cohesion and agreement
with national parties for hard and soft Eurosceptics from all political groups.
Table 18: Overall Hard/Soft Cooperation to Political Group
Mean loyalty PG Loyalty
Hard Eurosceptic

0.52

0.71

Soft Eurosceptic

0.72

0.85
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The table indicates that, on aggregate, soft Eurosceptic parties have better measures of
cooperation with their political groups and coalitions parties than hard Eurosceptics. The tables
below break each measure of loyalty down by political group.
Table 19: Hard/Soft Loyalty to PG (VoteWatch)
Grouping

Hard

Soft

ENF

0.69

N/A

EFDD

0.72

0.52

ECR

0.75

0.89

EPP

N/A

0.93

Total

0.71

0.85

Table 20: Hard/Soft Mean Loyalty (Clarin database)
Grouping

Hard

Soft

ENF

0.52

N/A

EFDD

0.48

0.31

ECR

0.62

0.69

EPP

N/A

0.81

Total

0.52

0.72

Similar to hypothesis 2, the totaled calculations of cooperation obscure a somewhat more
complicated picture. Soft Eurosceptics have a lower rate of overall cooperation in the EFDD,
where by each measure cooperation is over fifteen percent higher for hard Eurosceptics.
However, the only soft Eurosceptic in the group is Italy’s Five Star Movement. Soft Eurosceptics
have much higher rates of cooperation in the ECR however, as well as in the EPP. Overall
cooperation again appears more consistently connected with political group than hard or soft
Euroscepticism.
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However, the results above do not necessarily disprove the hypothesis. The EFDD (which
is considered more extreme) could be a political group where soft Eurosceptics are out of place.
The Five Star Movement might have such low rates because it is more pragmatic about voting
and willing to strategically back the EU and even integration if it sees it as useful: this would put
them at odds with the hard Eurosceptics in the group. Conversely, the less openly Eurosceptic
ECR could have a political center closer to the ideals of soft Eurosceptics, allowing them to vote
with the political group and other parties more of the time without fearing that they are betraying
their ideals (although the fact that the rates of cooperation for hard Eurosceptics are relatively
high here suggests that the political group itself somehow fosters more voting along political
group lines than the EFDD for all).
To test whether the line of reasoning above makes sense, I divided hard and soft
Eurosceptic votes up in a manner similar to the two hypotheses above. I calculated the percent of
the time hard Eurosceptic parties voted with other hard Eurosceptics to see whether this attribute
seemed to shape coalitions and larger voting patterns. I then repeated the calculations for soft
Eurosceptics and for hard-soft pairings to see how high their rates of voting together were. The
results are included below.

Table 21: Hard Eurosceptic Agreement with Other Hard Eurosceptics
Grouping

Mean loyalty

Number of Parties

ENF

0.52

5

EFDD

0.63

4

ECR

0.65

2

Total

0.58

11

Table 22: Soft Eurosceptic Agreement with Other Soft Eurosceptics
Grouping

Mean loyalty

Number of Parties

85

ECR

0.76

4

EPP

0.73

2

Total

0.75

6

Table 23: Mixed: Hard/Soft Cooperation Rates
Grouping

Mean loyalty

Number of Parties

ECR

0.69

6

EFDD

0.28

4

Total

0.53

10

Table 24: Mixed: Soft/Non-Eurosceptic Cooperation Rates
Grouping

Mean loyalty

Number of “Soft” Parties

EFDD

0.44

6

ECR

0.67

4

EPP

0.53

10

When the parties from across political groups are totaled for the first three tables,
Eurosceptic parties do appear to agree with a party sharing their “hardness” more often than a
Eurosceptic party with the opposite attribute. The total hard/soft cooperation rate is the lowest;
soft Eurosceptics and hard Eurosceptics more frequently vote with parties sharing their own level
of hardness than the other.
Looking at each political group, this aggregate is not entirely repeated: the ECR has a
higher rate of cooperation between hard and soft Eurosceptic parties than between hard
Eurosceptics. And once again, interpreting the rates from the ENF and EPP is difficult since they
only have one “type” of Eurosceptic party.
A plausible interpretation of the data is that while hard and soft Eurosceptic parties do not
deliberately or consciously contest votes within political groups, their differing willingness to
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compromise and possibly accept strengthening or condoning the power of EU institutions leads
them to vote differently some of the time. The thresholds and issues salient to each hard
Eurosceptic group may differ, meaning that they do not always buck the political group in the
same way in the ECR. Similarly, soft Eurosceptic parties in the EPP (Det Konservative
Folkeparti and Fidesz) may have different calculi about what they think is appropriate to
capitulate to in a center-right party. However, the quantitative data does suggest that degree of
Euroscepticism is a real point of divergence for Eurosceptic parties, which helps contribute to
their lack of unity.
Table 24 is of limited use, since for two of the groups there are few soft Eurosceptics and
only one non-Eurosceptic party in the group considered. However, while the Five Star
Movement’s rate of agreement is low, it is much higher than its rate of agreement with any other
party in its political group. The other two groups have means over fifty percent, indicating that
soft Eurosceptics frequently end up voting with non-Eurosceptic parties in their political group
(in the EPP this rate is higher than the soft Eurosceptics vote together). This indicates that there
are plenty of issues where soft Eurosceptics will agree or at least be willing to compromise with
parties that do not focus on Euroscepticism.
Looking at scores broken down by topic of vote further adds to the impression that hard
and soft Eurosceptics conceive of their opposition to EU integration in different ways. Using roll
call vote data, Whitaker and Lynch classify roll call votes in areas relating to constitutional
affairs, the budget, budgetary control and EP rules as the most related to European integration. In
the table below, I look at group cohesion rates for each of these categories. The ENF’s rates are
slightly lower than they would be in reality, since VoteWatch counts votes from the entire first
year in this measure (before the ENF had necessarily been formed).
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Table 25: Political Group Cohesion by Issue
Constitutional Affairs Budget

Budgetary Control EP Rules

EFDD 55.39%

60.70% 56.51%

73.14%

ENF

72.98% 71.08%

69.85%

73.90%

While the scores in most categories for both the EFDD and ENF are higher than their
overall cohesion, the rates still do not reflect a high degree of agreement. This is counterintuitive
because both groups are largely made up of national parties using Eurosceptic rhetoric and
frequently advocating policy to slow EU integration. The contestation on these votes
demonstrates that different parties have different definitions or standards for how they conceive
of voting with this Eurosceptic agenda.
Looking at roll call votes on development provides further evidence of hard and soft
Eurosceptics’ differing agendas. The table below includes measures of loyalty to party line
provided by VoteWatch for five major Eurosceptic parties.
Table 26: Eurosceptic Loyalty to PG by National Party
Party

UKIP

M5S

DPP

AfD

Fidesz

Hard/Soft

Hard

Soft

Hard

Hard

Soft

Development

76.56% 39.34% 76.39% 49.18% 94.59%

Regional Development 86.67% 41.33% 35.44% 55.00% 100.00%
In the EFDD, the soft Eurosceptic Five Star Movement (M5S) has a low rate of cohesion
with the political group line. A reasonable interpretation of this is that hard Eurosceptic parties,
such as UKIP, will oppose measures to offer financial benefits to countries through EU
institutions. However, the Five Star Movement, as a soft Eurosceptic, is willing to accept funding
and development if they believe it will benefit their country, regardless of whether it in this
instance “furthers” EU integration. The same could be true for Fidesz, which votes frequently
with the mainstream EPP on these issues, most likely to increase or improve development aid
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and grants. The AfD and DPP, as hard Eurosceptics in the ECR, may have relatively low
cohesion rates because they are surrounded by soft Eurosceptics and non-Eurosceptics who are
more comfortable than them with the idea of using the EU as a tool to provide regional
development aid and support.
Lastly, under this hypothesis, I look at the relationship between the Five Star Movement
and UKIP specifically as an example of differing attitudes on legislation by soft and hard
Eurosceptics. During its campaign for the European Parliament, the Five Star Movement
frequently used Eurosceptic rhetoric, suggesting an Italian referendum on whether to leave the
Eurozone among other things. However, many believe that it should be considered a soft
Eurosceptic party, given its actual voting record on legislation, its attempts to join ALDE (a
broadly Europhile group) and the fact that it toned down anti-EU advocacy in recent years.
UKIP, in contrast, is considered a hard Eurosceptic party. It advocated for years for the United
Kingdom to leave the European Union, and many argue that the 2016 referendum on British
membership in the EU was indirectly organized because of pressure from UKIP.
While the two parties are the largest in the EFDD, and have shared its presidency for
most of the Eighth Parliament, their actions on certain votes demonstrate their different attitudes
toward the European Union. When UKIP proposed to cut the United Kingdom’s contribution to
the European budget in many areas, M5S voted against it. 93 Their negative vote implied a
willingness to keep up funding of the EU at the expense of a member state, a stance that many
would consider strange for a party against European integration. Franzosi also notes that the Five
Star Movement voted with mainstream political groups on an “Employment and social aspects of
the Europe 2020 strategy”. This strategy advocated for the EU to be more involved in social
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affairs, a prospect which would mean certain principled opposition from most hard
Eurosceptics. 94
The Five Star Movement has also clashed with the rest of the EFDD on issues like
immigration and border control, where hard Eurosceptics want greater controls, and solidarity
funds for other EU countries following disasters. 95 The different stances on these votes illustrate
the potential clash between hard and soft Eurosceptics, despite an agreement on opposition to EU
integration. Soft Eurosceptics like M5S may be moved to vote for measures or policies that
implicitly endorse EU control or power, if that is seen as a strategically advantageous move or
advantages their country. This is less likely to be true for hard Eurosceptics who, rhetorically
anyway, often declare an utter opposition to EU power and growth.
The potential division between hard and soft Eurosceptics was demonstrated again when
the Five Star Movement attempted to leave the EFDD in January 2017. M5S attempted to join
the ALDE mid-session, claiming that the imminent departure of British MEPs due to Brexit
meant they did not see much of a future for their current political group. Admittedly, M5S was
denied entry into ALDE, after MEPs of that political group expressed amazement that their
leadership would even consider allowing such a Eurosceptic party into their generally pro-EU
political group. 96 However, the fact that M5S came so close, and that their MEPs and party
leadership would consider such a drastic realignment illustrates the difference between hard and
soft Eurosceptics. A hard Eurosceptic party like UKIP would likely find such a reversal or values
impossible, for a party that may quietly or pragmatically vote for the EU agenda a switch to a
less Eurosceptic political group is imaginable. While M5S saw several of its MEPs move to other
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political groups, its party leader Beppe Grillo managed to stop the flow, leaving most M5S
MEPs reluctantly in the EFDD. 97
Conclusions
Roll call votes from the Eighth European Parliament support the idea that Eurosceptic
parties have particularly low cohesion. Even in comparison to other niche party families, the
Eurosceptic far right exhibits particularly low coordination with other members of its political
group. This suggests that at this point in time, there is something particular to right-wing
Eurosceptic parties that hampers their overall voting loyalty and willingness to follow the
political group line. Not only does this show a willingness to defy political group leadership, but
since many of these Eurosceptic parties are clustered in political groups dominated by
Eurosceptic parties, it shows there are frequent points of disagreement among the Eurosceptics
themselves.
This chapter examines three possible reasons for such low cooperation: presence of
populism in Eurosceptic parties, position on the left-right spectrum and degree of opposition to
the European Union. Of the three, degree of opposition to the European Union appears from
what I found to be the most probable. Presence of populism seems slightly correlated with lower
voting loyalty, but there does not seem to be a policy-based division within these political groups
based on presence or absence of populism. There is also some evidence that left-right concerns
may shape voting, and lead centrist parties in dominantly right-wing groups to vote against the
political group line. However, this seems like at best a very partial explanation. Most parties in
the Eurosceptic political groups range from center to far right (a fairly narrow band), meaning
there is probably a limited degree of disagreement on these issues in the first place. So while
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disagreement on this spectrum may result in some lack of cohesion, especially on certain issues,
it seems unlikely to be the dominant source of friction for the Eurosceptic right.
The most compelling explanation among the hypotheses examined seems to be differing
degrees of Euroscepticism among Eurosceptic parties. Especially in an EU institution where
many pieces of legislation will be directly or indirectly related to EU power, there is ample
opportunity for parties with different priorities relating to EU integration to clash. While soft and
hard Eurosceptics may have some “baseline” of shared understanding, both the quantitative data
and case study above demonstrate that there are significant avenues for disagreement.
In the following chapter, I move past explanations based largely around individual party
ideology and belief, and examine the institutional factors that may limit Eurosceptic cooperation
within the Parliament.
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Chapter 5
The previous chapter examines whether cooperation for Eurosceptic parties is noticeably
lower than for other niche parties. It also looks at reasons that Eurosceptic parties may disagree
based around ideological lines. This chapter also mainly uses roll call vote data, and aspects of
Eurosceptic disagreement on these votes. However, it builds on a trend noticed in several figures
in the previous chapter. Cohesion on roll-call votes frequently seems highly based around the
political group of Eurosceptic parties.
I examine here whether institutionalization of political groups, as well as the national
parties themselves, may be responsible for lack of cohesion on roll call votes. I start by
examining evidence that the Eurosceptic political groups themselves are poorly structured, which
might make it difficult to coordinate votes or whip parties to vote along the party line. I then
move on to national party institutionalization, to determine whether part of the problem is that
national parties cannot control their own members. The results of this can help determine
whether Eurosceptic disunity is purely a function of ideological disagreement, and to what extent
it is related to the structures and regulations the parties find themselves cooperating in.
Political Group Cohesion Differences
When looking at general measures of cohesion, it is noticeable that cohesion rates are
starkly different depending on political group. In the table below, cohesion scores from the
VoteWatch site are in column two, and cohesion scores calculated for many political groups
from the Clarin data set are in column three. Column four is not strictly related to cohesion, but
tracks another measure of political group efficacy: the number of reports and opinions drafted by
members of the political group. While the ECR is fairly successful by this measure, it has the
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third lowest cohesion by either of the other two. The other two Eurosceptic political groups have
low ratings across all three measures.
Table 1: Political Group Cohesion and Effectiveness
Political
Group

PG
Loyalty

Mean
Loyalty

Reports and opinions drafted (as of
10/31/2017)

EPP

93.33%

S&D

92.28%

ECR

78.51%

ALDE

88.62%

GUE-NGL

82.76%

71.57%

115

Green-EFA

95.46%

83.73%

158

EFDD

48.51%

43.26%

52

ENF

74.05%

51.65%

11

>260
63.28%

198
214

Additionally, even among Eurosceptic parties, there is a similar trend of mean cohesion
increasing as the size and age of the political group does. This trend is odd if the expectation is
for “attitude to EU integration” to be central to these parties, which would seem a reasonable
supposition given their scores in relation to EU affairs on the CHES. Given this, one might
predict that Eurosceptic parties in less Eurosceptic political groups (EPP and ECR) would more
often vote against the political group line, since they are surrounded by parties that are less
Eurosceptic. However, as table 2 demonstrates, Eurosceptic parties within these groups are more
cohesive than Eurosceptic parties in the EFDD and ENF where Eurosceptics make up a bulk of
the coalition.
Table 2: Eurosceptic Loyalty within Political Group
Group PG loyalty Mean Loyalty
EFDD

0.67

0.45

ENF

0.69

0.52

94

ECR

0.84

0.66

EPP

0.93

0.81

As noted in the previous chapter, many of the Eurosceptic parties, when broken along
various cleavages (presence or absence of populism, left-right spectrum) seem to exhibit similar
patterns. Regardless of the presence or absence of certain attributes, Eurosceptic parties in
certain political groups have higher mean cohesion.
This raises a question of causality. It is perfectly plausible that this occurs because certain
groups have many Eurosceptics, who disagree frequently with each other (and the few nonEurosceptic parties in their groups) for ideological reasons. The fact that they are much more of
the make-up of these groups could lead to the low cohesion.
However, there is another explanation, not mutually exclusive, unrelated to the ideology
of individual national parties. It is possible that the rate of cohesion is related to the
institutionalization of the political group or its parties. This includes how factors like leadership,
tools of reward and sanction, and expectations are used to make people vote as a cohesive unit.
It seems almost self-evident that being a Eurosceptic party does not inherently make a
party not get along with others in its coalition, or be inclined to vote one’s own way. Fidesz and
Det Konservative Folkeparti in the EPP, for example, have high cohesion rates (in a largely nonEurosceptic political group), despite meeting my criteria for Euroscepticism and frequently
emphasizing nationalism in their party platforms.
In light of this, I examine two different possibilities relating to institutionalization. The
first is that the political group itself has not set up practices or rules conducive to compromise
and cohesion on voting. The second is that national parties themselves are uninstitutionalized:
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either dealing with internal fissures or divisions or struggling to develop a coherent or consistent
strategy for how to act within a new Parliament or political group.
I start by building up the theory behind each of these possibilities, and evaluate their
likelihood. I then look at national party cohesion and attendance to further back up my evidence.
Lack of Institutionalization of Political Group
Other authors have noticed similar trends of cohesion changing along group lines. But
there is disagreement on what is pertinent to these differences: the size of the political group, the
strength of sanctioning mechanisms, whether political groups think they will tip the balance in a
vote.
Bailer et al. summarize the literature arguing that the size of political group affects
cohesion. While having more MEPs may increase the cost and difficult of coordinating votes, the
size comes with advantages as well. Since more MEPs means more funding and staff from the
EP budget, there is greater ability to effectively monitor MEPs. The sanctioning methods of large
political groups, according to authors like Kaeding, are more developed, since they can monitor
better, but also offer more substantial positions in committees and rapporteurships. Bailer et al.
also say that, “the larger a party group, the higher the chances that it affects a policy outcome so
that a group worries more about cohesion”. 98
Both elements of this theory of cohesion seems plausible. According to VoteWatch, the
EFDD party line won only 30.47% of votes through late 2017, the ENF won only 29.68%. These
political groups might not care enough to use whipping mechanisms if they see themselves as
unlikely to change the tide in most votes. And the largest political groups do get better access to
highly valued spots on committees.
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However, while increase in budget and staff may generally correlate with greater
cohesion, I argue that this cannot be the complete picture. For these sanctioning mechanisms to
be an advantage to political groups, they must have the coordination and know-how to use them
effectively. Were they unfamiliar with Parliamentary norms and rules, an increase in funding or
access to better committee positions seems unlikely to offset a large increase in MEPs. In other
words, the benefits of a large political group seem likely to have a temporal dimension: a new
political group unfamiliar with the best way to coordinate its national parties should not see an
immediate increase in voting cohesion.
The ECR, despite being the third largest political group in Parliament, for example, has
lower cohesion than the next three smaller parties. It was formed in 2009, and saw an influx of
new coalition partners, many Eurosceptic in 2014. While size of political group may factor in to
cohesion in the way Bailer et al. suggest, I argue that looking at how recently a political group
was formed should be used as a complementary indicator of probably group coordination. This
fits the cohesion patterns currently on display in the Parliament.
This also fits the pattern of group cohesion rising over time. Many observers of the
Parliament have found that over the decades cohesion has increased for all political groups 99
(although other scholars contest that this is overstated or illusory). 100 While the increase is often
attributed to an institutional clarification of the Parliament’s powers and responsibilities, it seems
logical that it has as much to do with institutionalization of the political groups. There may be a
deepening of unity between coalition partners as they learn how to best coordinate with each
other and maximize collective benefits.
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Not only have the recently formed (Eurosceptic) political groups had much less time than
established parties to work out procedures and plans to try to curb ‘rebel’ voting, but they also
have had less time to work out procedures and methods to best facilitate compromise and
coordinated voting.
This matters for some of the reasons that Faas and Corbett, from Chapter 2, suggests.
Admittedly, the whipping tools of all political groups are probably only effective in some
instances. This means that established political groups frequently use internal policy
compromises to decide the party line ahead of time. With information on the upcoming votes,
and an entire week to meet and discuss priorities, a political group will often be able to unify on
many roll call votes. Bressanelli et al. provide further evidence of this. Looking at roll call vote
data from the early Twenty-First Century, they argue that informal and early agreements are of
central importance especially to large centrist political groups. Even ideological diversity can be
partially overcome by political group discipline in the form of carrots and sticks. 101 They find
that this is especially true for high stakes voting, which “change the perceived risks of defection
in plenary; they, therefore, impact on the legislative behaviour of policy-seeking parties and
MEPs; and this impact works through strengthening the organisational mechanisms behind
cohesion”. 102
In the mind of Bressanelli et al., informal agreements are necessary for political group
coordination, and are highly tied to systems of sanction for national parties. I present three
reasons such informal agreements are likely difficult for Eurosceptic political groups.
First, as mentioned above, it is unclear that such small political groups even have the
resources to offer or create systems of reward or compromise. Being the smallest political
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groups, they are less likely than larger political groups to be given prestigious positions on
committees. Furthermore, in several instances the far-right and Eurosceptic nature of the groups
has prevented them from being given access to resources that other groups use to reward valued
MEPs or national parties. After Nigel Farage of UKIP made a comment that he wanted to
“sabotage” the Parliament, an EFDD candidate for the Petitions Committee was voted down.
Several ECR candidates from the AfD, running for committee positions were also voted down
due to antipathy over the party platform. 103 While it is traditional to allow political groups a
certain proportion of committee spots, the Parliament has demonstrated a willingness to alter this
for Eurosceptics.
Secondly, it is unclear that the current leadership of Eurosceptic political groups is able
or interested in building up cohesive political groups in the Parliament. In an interview, Nigel
Farage said, “we may be able to slow and stop some of the legislation, but in reality I gave up
years ago in believing the EU could be reformed”. 104 This statement expresses the belief that
little the EFDD does will actually change outcomes on votes, and hints that because of this
Farage does not follow the outcome of votes closely. Coming from one of the leaders of the
EFDD, it seems likely that such a philosophy, if genuine, would not move him to work hard to
mobilize or whip votes. In early 2018, David Borrelli, the other co-president of the EFDD, left
the political group entirely to become a Non-Inscrit, without clear explanation. The lack of
caring of individual political leaders, in other words, manifests in weak political group structure.
But secondly, many leaders of Eurosceptic political groups also have their own roles in domestic
politics that make it unlikely they can spend a large amount of time trying to reform or structure
a political group. Marine Le Pen and Nigel Farage both are leaders of their parties on a domestic
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level as well. During the Eighth Parliament, each country had substantial national issues: the
Brexit vote and aftermath was clearly a central issue for UKIP, and Marine Le Pen ran for
President in 2017. Heavy involvement in domestic affairs like these take up significant resources
and attention of these leaders. And when these leaders are meant to coordinate cohesion, such
lack of attention matters: Bailer et al. say that party leaders play a noticeable role in the variance
of political group cohesion. 105
Lastly, two of the three Eurosceptic political groups operate on the brink of dissolving.
With the loss of MEPs, they could fall below the thresholds required for a political group to
exist. This gives leaders very limited credibility to whip national parties or individual MEPs in
any way, since they depend on these same individuals for survival. But furthermore, to the extent
that leadership and compromise in these groups exists it is probably focused on keeping the
political group alive. Early 2017 saw the Five Star Movement consider leaving the EFDD
entirely, which would have caused the end of the EFDD as well. Such constant threat limits the
time political group leaders can focus on coordinating parties, and makes their larger goal to
continue existing at all.
In summary, methods to control and coordinate voting behavior are likely to be more
developed among non-Eurosceptic political groups. This is both because they have had more
time to acclimate to these mechanisms, but also because the effectiveness of these mechanisms
have more consequence both to political group leaders, who may believe their group’s unity will
affect the passage of a vote, and to MEPs in the group who are more likely to see substantial and
meaningful promotion or relegation for voting behavior. Eurosceptic political groups’ priority
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has had to be avoiding collapse, rather than cajoling or bullying national parties who vote against
the line.
Lack of National Party Institutionalization
I first examine whether Eurosceptic national parties are stable entities that can control
their own members. If a national party has power struggles or ideological divisions within it, that
may lead to frequently splitting the vote on Parliamentary procedures. Furthermore, if one
faction of a national party retains leadership, putting it in line for committee positions and other
perks of political group membership, the less favored faction may have no incentive to vote with
the political group line. While it seems likely that all political groups have had parties who are
fragmented or internally divided, I examine whether this is particularly true of Eurosceptic
parties, and if so, whether this contributes to the low political group cohesion overall. Signs of
lack of national party institutionalization include fissures within the party, MEPs leaving the
party or political group, low internal cohesion within the party, and lack of agreement between
party members about what their strategy within the Parliament should be, or what the norms of
behavior they follow are.
There are several reasons to believe that lack of institutionalization may tend to affect
Eurosceptic parties more than other party families within the European Parliament. Many
Eurosceptic parties have been formed relatively recently, the Five Star Movement (Italy), KNP
(Poland), SVOBDNI (Czechia) and SaS (Slovakia) were all formed 2009 or later. This not only
means aspects of their platform may not be entirely ironed out, but they may also be
undeveloped in areas including leadership, strategic calculation, and coordination. Additionally,
multiple Eurosceptic parties have had public battles over control of the party, often between
politicians with more or less radical views for the party’s future. Since the elections for the 2014

101

Parliament, for example, the AfD has had two deep splits, the first prompting five of the AfD
MEPs to disavow the party and declare themselves no longer part of it. 106
There are several other examples that show that Eurosceptic parties within Parliament
have less than absolute control of their MEPs. UKIP and the National Front have both seen MEP
defections, the first by MEPs who sought to join the British Conservatives, the second by MEPs
who were disturbed by Marine Le Pen’s public disavowal of her father to detoxify the National
Front. Some MEPs have been accused of mismanagement or misuse of Parliamentary funds.
This certainly damages Eurosceptic political groups; having fewer members lowers their
funding and may leave them dangerously close to dissolution. But it is less clear that in many
instances these divisions have meaningfully affected voting cohesion. As discussed below,
internal voting cohesion is actually fairly high for many Eurosceptic national parties. It is not the
situation that these political groups have low cohesion because a faction of each party votes
against the political group line, rather parties tend to vote against it (or not attend) as a whole.
The second dimension of national party institutionalization is to examine whether the
national party has not developed practices or modes of behavior specifically for utility
maximization within the European Parliament. Admittedly, this has some degree of overlap with
political group institutionalization, since a well-structured political group could arguably still
coerce or teach a new national party to behave in certain ways. However, it does seem necessary
to consider parties that are new to a political group or the Parliament itself as separate from the
Political Group Institutionalization hypothesis. According to this theory, new national parties
may not have yet realized that norms of internal compromise and collective voting with the
political group is in their interest, and so vote frequently along national party agenda.

106

“Germany’s Eurosceptics: A Bad Time to Break Up,” The Economist.

102

Since many Eurosceptic parties joined the Parliament relatively recently, the low
cohesion rates of Eurosceptic political groups could be an anomaly: an effect that will lower as
national parties gain a greater understanding of the Parliament and develop strategies to
maximize their interests within it. In other words, Eurosceptic parties have yet to be exposed to
the socializing effect of political groups more than many other party families, but should adapt.
With this understanding should come greater receptivity to sanctioning mechanisms and early
agreements on voting issues.
There are several issues with this as an explanation of low cohesion. There does not seem
to be much recorded precedent around new MEPs or new parties struggling to acclimate to the
European Parliament in this way. Lindstaedt et al. find that in general new members of the
Parliament tend to defect less than older members. Rather than trying to strike out on their own,
they may follow the example of other MEPs and the political group to inform how they vote on
issues. 107 Perhaps this is less true for a new political group with many parties new to the
Parliament. But at that point, this seem indistinguishable from the claim that the political group
itself lacks institutionalization.
Furthermore, even new Eurosceptic parties have fairly high cohesion in some
circumstances. The Danish People’s Party joined the ECR in 2014, and has fairly high cohesion
(.64 using the Clarin database). Bolin points out that in their first year in the European
Parliament, the Sweden Democrats voted frequently with the political group line of the EFDD.
This is noteworthy since they were believed to be ideologically more similar to the Danish
People’s Party. 108 Additionally, they had not been exposed to any “socializing effect” of either
Parliament or group yet. So while new parties may sometimes struggle to decide on a strategy for
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the Parliament, and opt to always follow their own parties agenda, that is demonstrably not
something they always do, Eurosceptic or not.
Data from Roll Call Votes
For each Eurosceptic party, I gathered the year it first entered Parliament, the year it first
entered its current political group and the year its current political group was created. On the
chart below, I mapped the strength of loyalty to political group against these, with each dot
representing a party.
Figure 3: Eurosceptic Parties Cooperation by Dates of Entry

I hoped to find strong correlations between one of the measures and adherence to the
party line. A strong negative correlation between loyalty and political group formation year
would indicate that older political groups are correlated with greater loyalty from members,
suggesting they have more entrenched cohesion mechanisms. A negative correlation on the other
two measures would indicate that national parties with more experience in the Parliament or their
political group tend to know to follow their line more. However, no note-worthy correlations
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were apparent, possibly because all Eurosceptic parties are in political groups formed relatively
recently with the exception of the EPP.
Looking at measures of cohesion and attendance was more useful for evaluating the
institutionalization hypothesis. The second and third column of Table 4 below measure the mean
internal cohesion of national parties. Because national parties with one member automatically
have complete cohesion, they are not included in the chart, the mean for each political group is
an aggregate of the internal cohesion of all national parties with more than one member. The
second column measures cohesion among members who are actually there and participated
(voted for, against, or to abstain). The third column includes in it members who did not attend or
vote in any way. Measures of internal cohesion are derived from roll call vote data taken from
the Clarin dataset. The fourth column shows rates of attendance for all MEPs in the political
group. This includes parties with only one MEP, and was procured from VoteWatch in late 2017.
Table 4: Internal Cohesion and Attendance of National Parties within Political Groups
Political Group Cohesion among Voters Cohesion Among MEPs Average Attendance
ENF

0.98

0.86

0.89

EFDD

0.98

0.86

0.83

GUE-NGL

0.97

0.83

0.90

Greens-EFA

0.98

0.84

0.90

ECR

0.96

0.80

0.87

EPP

0.97

0.84

0.90

Non-Inscrit

0.85

There are several noteworthy patterns. The cohesion among voters (excluding MEPs who
did not attend) and the cohesion among all MEPs of a party is fairly high for Eurosceptic
political groups, comparable to others. This suggests that Eurosceptic parties actually have
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decent cohesion internally. When they vote on issues there is often little “spread,” not much
more than in other political groups. This makes the theory that Eurosceptic political groups are
disunified because of national party dysfunction seem unlikely. While this thesis does not look at
how Eurosceptic dysfunction manifests on a domestic politics level, it seems to have limited
effects for EP voting cohesion. What seems more likely is that national parties maintain
discipline among themselves on which way to vote, and stick to it during the Plenary Session,
even if it contradicts the group line.
Bringing in the average participation of the political group supports this conclusion
further. It is true that the attendance rates of the more Eurosceptic parties are on the lower end.
But since the cohesion rates of all political groups are more or less on par, the Eurosceptic parties
may just as a party not turn out to vote on certain issues or on certain days. It is quite possible
they still coordinate as a national party for votes they view as important.
The chart also suggests that some larger groups (such as the ECR) may not have much
more success in “whipping” MEPs to attend votes than the most Eurosceptic parties do.
However, it is still possible they are better at whipping attendance for votes important to party
leadership.
While the national party institutionalization hypothesis does not seem to be supported
from this data, it could still be true that national parties being “unused” to the Parliament or a
new political group make them as a party vote against the line. However, this still means that
political group leadership is incapable of structuring incentives in such a way as to force them to
compromise and enter into Early Agreements on voting.
Conclusions
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After advancing a theory on institutionalization, and examining both qualitative and
quantitative dimensions of the current Parliament, there are several reasonable takeaways.
Eurosceptic parties may have greater instability overall, which occasionally leads to significant
issues within the Parliament, such as the divide of the AfD. However, there is limited evidence to
demonstrate that internal divisions of a few parties creates or even significantly contributes to the
frequent disunity of the entire political group. Additionally, it does not seem feasible to blame
the disunity of these political groups on the “newcomer” status of many of their parties. One
should not expect the cohesion of these political groups to rise in the next Parliament or two if
more fundamental issues are not addressed.
What seems more plausible is that lack of leadership and structure within Eurosceptic
political groups is a major barrier to cohesion. As many Eurosceptic political groups are newly
formed, several led by parties that have limited experience heading political groups, there are
signs that certain processes and mechanisms have not been normalized or used within them in
the same way that they have in other groups. Leadership of the groups seems unattached,
sanctioning mechanisms undeveloped. While perhaps time would allow for greater development
of these cohesion mechanisms, they are also hampered by the lack of caring among the
individuals who would develop them. If the EFDD cannot see itself as being the deciding factor
in a vote, it has less incentive to make sure it can get everybody to back the group line. Because
of this, it is questionable whether these mechanisms are likely to become more institutionalized
in the future. This is especially true since it seems doubtful that the Eurosceptic political groups
will remain the same in the next session. The British Conservatives and UKIP may leave the
Parliament entirely with Brexit, and the Five Star Movement appears to have become less
Eurosceptic in recent months. This may mean that new Eurosceptic political groups may be
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different enough that any norms or rules of behavior previously established to compel cohesion
or coordination are lost.
To be clear, lack of political group leadership and mechanisms to promote compromise
and unity only matter at the point when there is disagreement on which way to vote. If that were
not the case, no coordination would be necessary and all Eurosceptic parties could be expected to
always vote in the “favorable” direction. So while this chapter argues that lack of political group
institutionalization is a major factor in limiting Eurosceptic unity, it is clearly not the whole
picture. To understand the reasons for disagreement on policy, Chapter 4 is most relevant.
However, the lack of institutionalization in Eurosceptic parties exacerbates existing divides and
makes it difficult for compromise and agreement within the Parliament. While other political
groups may have as much ideological diversity, the tools of institutionalization they use have
allowed them to overcome this diversity to a greater degree. Deprived of these tools, Eurosceptic
parties lack a way to coordinate.
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Conclusion
While the previous three chapters offer insights into Eurosceptic disunity, they examine
different aspects of this disunity in a fairly isolated and compartmentalized way. In this
conclusion, I seek to integrate my results to create a more complete picture of how Eurosceptic
parties interact with each other in the European Parliament. I start off the Conclusion by
summarizing the major conclusions of my analysis, and putting forth a theory to explain the
order and importance of each component of disunity. I then explore the larger impacts and uses
of my research. In the Introduction, I explain that an examination of current Eurosceptic
cooperation within the Parliament is useful for predicting whether Eurosceptic parties in the
future will be able to cooperate to a greater degree, and the likelihood of them becoming a more
unified force. Additionally, looking at the issues that prevent cooperation within the Parliament
could be useful also for assessing whether cooperation among right-wing Eurosceptics outside
the Parliament will rise over the coming years. Since the last decade has seen Eurosceptics make
significant gains in some political spheres, the ability of these parties to cooperate across borders
and institutions could have substantial impacts on the European political system.
Results
The first dimension of Eurosceptic cooperation I examine is the process through which
national parties form and join political groups. It is important to reiterate that outside of the
hypotheses presented in Chapter 3, there are presumably other factors that shape the political
group a national party is likely to join. Ideological proximity and resource maximization, for
example, are discussed in the literature review. Most scholars seem to believe most parties’
choices are likely to be most related to some mix of these two. However, this hypothesis
examines concerns over reputation and respectability that are likely to be of far lesser importance
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to more mainstream parties and groups. The central question under consideration is why
Eurosceptic parties do not congregate in one unified political group, which would maximize EP
resources and quite possibly allow for a greater shared agenda for the group.
I highlight two concerns that Eurosceptic national parties have that make such a large
alliance impossible. First, many Eurosceptic parties worry that association with other parties will
damage their own reputation. While there are certain Eurosceptic parties that most seem to balk
at (such as Jobbik, which sits in the Non-Inscrits) there is variability in whether other parties are
considered a liability. Decisions over whether a party is acceptable to sit with may depend on
whether the party believes domestic voters will notice such an association and punish the party
for it. Functionally, this has led to a Parliament where a Eurosceptic political group is all but
impossible. It has also pitted the ENF and EFDD against each other; since UKIP refuses to
associate with the National Front both have to compete for coalition partners.
The second factor for national parties looking to join political groups is the incentive of
some to join political groups that actively enhance their respectability or credibility. As noted in
Chapter 3, the statements of officials from several Eurosceptic parties indicate that they joined
the ECR since they saw it as more legitimate and respectable than the farther right groups. For a
party that may be ostracized by the mainstream parties in its own nation, or struggling to reassure
voters that it is not extremist, such an association can be an advantage. The effect of this is to
narrow the pickings for a majority Eurosceptic group further since viable candidates are instead
admitted into more respectable political groups like the ECR and EPP.
The combination of these two incentives, paired with the still relatively small number of
Eurosceptic MEPs in the Parliament, means that Eurosceptic parties are divided between groups.
This lowers their speaking time and total allocation of EP funding. It also severely limits any
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ability for all Eurosceptic to coordinate ahead of votes, since they are split into multiple
coalitions.
Even after partnerships have been established, Eurosceptic parties frequently vote against
the political group line, even when the group is overwhelmingly composed of Eurosceptic
parties.
I examined whether presence or absence of populism, differences in left-right spectrum
ideology, and difference in degree of antipathy to the EU were meaningful points of cleavage.
For all three characteristics I examined, there was some level of difference between parties with
different attributes. However, after looking at quantitative and qualitative evidence, the attribute
that seemed the most important as a divider of Eurosceptic parties was degree of Euroscepticism.
Position on the left-right spectrum and presence or absence of populism yielded more ambiguous
results that led to less certainty whether they were important in understanding Eurosceptic
disagreement. Looking at position on roll call votes, as well as clearly documented disagreement
between parties like the Five Star Movement and UKIP shows that there are differences in voting
preference based around how much national parties are opposed to EU integration and
operations. Falling in different places on this spectrum may have heightened importance in the
European Parliament in particular because it focuses so often on rules and legislation that
directly or indirectly invoke EU integration and power.
This thesis does not examine whether there are similar ideological disagreements among
other party families in the Parliament. However, it seems likely that whatever disagreement may
exist is made significantly worse by lack of institutionalization of the Eurosceptic political
groups. As outlined in Chapter 5, both the ENF and EFDD have leaders who are heavily
involved in domestic politics. While this arguably may be a product of poor national party
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institutionalization (the parties are small or disorganized enough that they cannot delegate
effectively), this manifests primarily in underdeveloped group leadership. One of these leaders,
Nigel Farage, has signaled that he does not see particular importance in voting, since he thinks it
is unlikely he will be able to curb the larger political groups. Methods of reward and sanction
used by other political groups seem underused (possibly because committee positions are
occasionally untenable for these political groups, and possibly because political leaders have
little leverage over national party members when their group is on the point of dissolution). I
argue that ideological divides which might otherwise be overcome through compromise or
coordination are less likely to be resolved because of the lack of discipline and structure in the
Eurosceptic political groups themselves. In other words, hard vs soft Euroscepticism gives
Eurosceptics something to disagree over, but this disagreement is exacerbated by uniquely poor
institutionalization of political group. For the most part, the Eurosceptic parties themselves tend
to agree on an intra-party level what is worth voting on and which way to vote on it.
The hypotheses and levels of support for them are summarized in the table below.
Table 1: Summary of Hypotheses
Hypothesis

Type of cooperation
being measured

Conclusion

Strategic decision-making related
to concerns over reputation limits
coalition partners and lowers
cooperation

Formalized alliance in Hypothesis supported, this
political groups
concern has aided political group
fragmentation

Niche party families, including
Eurosceptics, have similarly low
voting cooperation

Voting cohesion
within political group

Not supported- Eurosceptics
have lower cooperation

Presence or absence of populism
leads to lack of Eurosceptic
cooperation

Eurosceptic parties
within their political
groups

Low/inconclusive levels of
support from evidence
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Differences in ideology on the
left-right spectrum lead to lack of
Eurosceptic cooperation

Eurosceptic parties
within their political
groups

Low/inconclusive levels of
support from evidence

Differences in level of opposition
to the EU lead to lack of
Eurosceptic cooperation

Eurosceptic parties
within their political
groups

Strongly supported from
evidence

Lack of formalized structure
within political groups leads to
lack of Eurosceptic cooperation

Voting cohesion
Supported in the case of political
within political groups groups, less supportive for
and national parties
individual national parties

Future Eurosceptic Unity in the Parliament
In this section, I ask what my examination of current disunity suggests about the future of
Eurosceptics in the Parliament. Few scholars suggest that Eurosceptic parties are likely to see
major downturns in coming years, many argue that support for populist and Eurosceptic parties
is likely to remain at this level or increase. In this context, is unity in the European Parliament
just a matter of time? If the current disagreement is due largely to minor ideological differences,
or unfamiliarity with the system, one might expect Eurosceptics to be able to use and master the
Parliament as they become more familiar with the system. With enough support in a future round
of elections, it may even be possible for Euroscepticism to become the “opposition” in the
European Parliament.
There are several plausible reasons why cooperation may increase among Eurosceptic
parties. First, if more Eurosceptic parties or MEPs were elected, that might solve some of the
problems current political group leaders face in terms of structure. More MEPs in the political
group could mean more effective systems for promotion and punishment, since actually
important committee seats would be more likely. Furthermore, if gains in the number of MEPs
translated into larger political groups, the groups might no longer be on the brink of dissolution.
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This could translate into greater ability by political group leaders to whip MEPs into voting
along political group lines.
There are multiple divergences among Eurosceptic parties along ideological lines.
However, it does seem plausible that parties may change positions during their time in
Parliament that create more cohesive political groups, and facilitate greater compromise. Both
the Northern League and Five Star Movement have softened their tone towards the EU since
2014. If the literature on “socialization” within Parliament is accurate, such an outcome is even
likely.
Despite this, I argue that coordination within the Parliament is unlikely to rise
significantly. One reason for this is that there are no signs that Eurosceptic leaders in these
political groups are “mastering” whipping, or devoting significant attention to it. Early 2017 saw
the EFDD almost break apart; it was salvaged not by political group leader action but because
other political groups refused to take the Five Star Movement in. Even if Eurosceptic political
group leaders have greater “means” to create enforcement of voting, it is deeply unclear that
there is will to use this effectively.
Secondly, political groups in future sessions will not be identical to current
configurations. They likely will not even be similar. The British Conservatives, which make up a
large part of the ECR will leave the Parliament following Brexit, as will UKIP in the EFDD.
While new parties, such as the Five Star Movement, may be doing well recently, their continued
success is not a certainty. What this means is that even if political group leaders and national
parties began to learn how to compromise and find balance in their political groups, the
arrangements reached will likely not be particularly helpful after the next set of elections. With
new parties, new leaders and new dynamics, lessons learned may not carry over. This is likely to
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similarly disrupt any “socialization” process that MEPs may have gone through in their current
political groups. If MEPs change views to fit their group, their new position may be out of sync
with whatever political group they join in 2019. Because of this, it seems unlikely that future
political groups will contain wiser or more able leadership, or noticeably more cooperative
MEPs. Ideological differences over legislation will still lead to disloyalty to the political group
line without more institutionalization.
Lastly, strategic decision-making to avoid certain national parties also seems unlikely to
diminish. Eurosceptic parties’ attempt to make themselves respectable and mainstream to their
domestic voters is not an easy task. For that reason there are likely to be Eurosceptic parties that
are frequently avoided since less radical Eurosceptic parties want to avoid unfavorable
comparisons to them. Others, like Fidesz and the DPP, seem likely to stay in more respectable
and powerful political groups for protection and enhanced respectability. There is no reason to
believe that Eurosceptic parties will stop taking into account reputation of partners when forming
political groups.
Future Eurosceptic Unity in Europe at large
It is fairly clear that there is low cooperation among Eurosceptics in the European
Parliament. But it is less immediately obvious if those attempting to set up Eurosceptic or
populist networks outside the Parliament will fail due to the same root causes. If lack of
cooperation in the Parliament was due purely to Parliamentary rules and requirements,
Eurosceptic cooperation outside of the body might be more successful. Similarly, if the EP
emphasizes certain issues that divide Eurosceptics more, perhaps Eurosceptics outside of the
body could concentrate on other issues to unite them. Using the analysis of this paper, I offer
several thoughts on the likelihood of this.
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As hinted at above, conflict and cooperation outside the Parliament will in many ways be
vastly different than the types of issues that come up within the institution. Because of this,
looking at voting records from inside the Parliament is not a very good measure of the issue
overlap that Eurosceptic parties may have outside of it. Eurosceptic parties may utilize major
themes and platform issues to coordinate on that rarely come up in the Parliament. And issues
that might be flashpoints for conflict in the Parliament (such as EU development policy) seem
less likely to come up outside of it. Additionally, even soft Eurosceptics who may like some
aspects of EU policy often criticize the EU and warn of it degrading sovereignty, so the soft-hard
divide might not be an issue. Over the years there have been several attempts to create a far-right
network with a broadly Eurosceptic outlook.
But while looking at voting records from Parliament may not predict Eurosceptic
cooperation outside the Parliament, the process of them forming coalitions seems to suggest that
there will be problems. When UKIP called the National Front anti-Semitic it was not just
rejecting a possible partnership with them in the Parliament, but an association of any form.
While the decline of UKIP in recent years may end this major feud, there are still plenty of
parties likely to see the National Front’s past as a major liability to normalize themselves to
domestic voters. It seems likely that a similar dynamic to coalition formation in the EP would be
present in any effort to form a transnational or international Eurosceptic movement. Any attempt
to invite or include “radical” Eurosceptics would make the movement unacceptable to many
others.
Additionally, the incentives to form groups within Parliament are arguably larger than
outside it. But even with direct financial incentives to form political groups, and shared
legislation to vote on, Eurosceptic national parties often have trouble cooperating. It is unclear

116

why they would be more likely to get along or push disagreements aside when they do not stand
to gain much. If Eurosceptic parties continue to be wary of other parties’ bad reputations, or
think that their own sovereignty “trades off” with other countries, it is not encouraging for the
prospect of a larger alliance.
As different parties “radicalize” and “de-radicalize” perhaps the prospects of a substantial
international alliance could change. If enough Eurosceptic parties gained power in their
countries, for example, they would perhaps be more interested in opening more formalized lines
of communication with other ruling Eurosceptics. But the evidence from the European
Parliament suggests that for now, even if Eurosceptic continue to make moderate gains,
international cooperation will likely not be any less anemic.
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Appendix
Table 1. All Parties Qualifying as Eurosceptic currently sitting in the European Parliament
(leftist parties excluded)
Country
U.K.
France
Italy
Hungary
Germany
Italy
Denmark
Netherlands
Austria
Poland
Hungary
Finland
Sweden
Czechia
Denmark
Germany
Czechia
Slovakia
Netherlands

Party
UKIP
FN
M5S
Fidesz
AfD
LN
DPP
PVV
FPO
KNP
JOBBIK
True Finns
Sweden Democrats
Civic Democratic
Party
Dansk Folkeparti
National
Democratic Party
Party of Free
Citizens
Freedom and
Solidarity
Political Reformed
Party

Seats
24
23
17
12
7
5
4
4
4
4
3
2
2
2

Current seats
22
20
17
11
2
5
3
4
4
3
3
2
2
2

EU Position
1.14
1.21
1.43
2.71
1.61
1.14
1.91
1.09
1.9
1.06
1.21
1.6
1.27
2.87

EU Salience
9.14
8.46
8.86
6.36
9.54
8.86
7.27
8.36
6.70
8
6.78
8.20
6.14
6.67

1
1

1
1

1.09
1.67

9.73
5.10

1

1

1.33

7.67

1

1

2.86

6.93

1

1

2.55

5.27
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Table 2. Additional attributes of Eurosceptic parties. Non-Inscrits excluded.
Left(0)Party Name Political Group Hard/soft Populist Right(10)
UKIP

EFDD

Hard

No

9.14

FN

ENF

Hard

Yes

9.64

M5S

EFDD

Soft

Yes

4.67

Fidesz

EPP

Soft

Yes

7.93

AfD

ECR

Hard

No

8.92

LN

ENF

Hard

Yes

8.86

DF

ECR

Hard

Yes

6.90

PVV

ENF

Hard

Yes

9.25

FPO

ENF

Hard

Yes

8.70

KNP

ENF

Hard

Yes

9.53

PS

ECR

Soft

Yes

5.11

SD

EFDD

Hard

Yes

7.76

ODS

ECR

Soft

No

8

FolkB

EPP

Soft

No

2

SVOBODNI EFDD

Hard

No

8.71

SaS

ECR

Soft

No

7.28

SGP

ECR

Soft

No

8.11
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Glossary of Abbreviations
AfD

Alternative for Germany (Germany party)

DPP

Danish People’s Party (Denmark party)

ECR

European Conservatives and Reformists

EFDD

Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy

ENF

Europe of Nations and Freedoms

GUE-NGL

European United Left-Nordic Green Left

Greens-EFA

Greens-European Free Alliance

KNP

Congress of the New Right (Polish party)

LN

Lega Norda (Italian party)

MEP

Member of the European Parliament

M5S

Five Star Movement (Italian party)

PVV

Party for Freedom (Dutch party)

RCV

Roll call vote

UKIP

United Kingdom Independence Party
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